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THE REGULARIZATION OF NONMARITAL
COHABITATION: RIGHTS AND




Twenty years ago, I wrote a law review article criticizing the M1ar-
vin' view that nonmarital cohabitation is most appropriately regulated
by the rubric of contract.2 I suggested that stable, long-term cohabita-
tion, like marriage, should give rise to a legal status entailing rights
and responsibilities, both inter se and third-party, unless the cohabi-
tants have made an enforceable agreement to the contrary.3 Since
then, other American commentators have espoused this perspective,
4
and the foreign law sources upon which I drew for inspiration two
decades ago have further developed their status-based treatment of
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank Donald R. Blumberg for his
helpful editorial suggestions.
1 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
2 See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Persprtihe,
28 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1159-70 (1981).
3 See id. at 1167.
4 See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
AMarriage, 75 Op. L. Ruv. 709, 711-12 (1996); William A. ReppyJr., Property and Support
Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status; 44 L.-. L RE%,
1677, 1678 (1984); Amy Lir, Comment, In Defense of Washington's Equitable Treatment
of Pseudomarital Property, 29 IDAHo L. REv. 975, 995-98 (1992); Kathryn S. Vaughn,
Comment, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or Aboli-
tion of Common-Law Aariage?, 28 Hous. L Rv. 1131, 1147-49 (1991). For criticism
of the application of contract analysis to marriage and marriage-like cohabitation, see,
for example, Margaret F. Brinig, Status, Contract and Covenant, 79 CoPNT-L. L REV.
1573, 1594-99 (1994) (revieing MILTON C. REGa-N, JR., FAm.LY Lw, AND THE Puisurr
oF Irns.Acy (1993)), and Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 C . L REv. 1,
13-24 (1989). For an earlier critique of the unjust enrichment remedy, see Robert C.
Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enridment" From Status to Contract and Bacb Again?,
77 Mica-. L. REx, 47, 49-51 (1978).
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cohabitation.5 Yet, I can only modestly congratulate myself on my pre-
science, for I did not even dimly foresee the path that law and society
would take in regularizing nonmarital cohabitation in the United
States. Although the developing substantive law of cohabitation is a
matter of interest in itself, the story of how and, more speculatively,
why we have moved toward that law is at least equally interesting. Le-
gal developments are best understood contextually. In this Essay, I
will attempt to link the particular character of the American welfare
state with the developing American regularization of nonmarital co-
habitation. A comparative look at convergent developments in our
closest cultural relatives, English-speaking common-law countries, also
sheds useful light on certain aspects of American family law and its
relation to our version of the welfare state.
The American welfare state (social security in the larger sense)
consists of three interrelated institutions. The family is a highly effec-
tive system of wealth redistribution. In the family, income is generally
redistributed from one adult to another (most often from men to wo-
men) and from adults to children. During the ongoing conjugal rela-
tionship, redistribution rarely requires any legal intervention. The
economics of the household and, secondarily, ties of affection tend to
assure ample redistribution. When a conjugal relationship dissolves
by divorce, family law seeks to accomplish wealth redistribution by
means of well-developed rules of property division, child support, and
spousal support. When a marriage persists until the death of one of
the parties, wealth redistribution is effected by the laws of intestacy,
the common-law elective share, and community property distribution.
Equally important is the American institution sometimes charac-
terized as the "employee welfare state' 6 or "shadow welfare state."17 In-
5 See infra Part III.C.
6 See, e.g., David Charney, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEx. L. REnv.
1601, 1601-02 (1996).
7 See, e.g., MARIE GoTrcuc, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE: LABOR, BUSINESS,
AND THE PoLITCS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 1-16 (2000).
The "employee welfare state," or "shadow welfare state," overlaps but is not co.
extensive with the "hidden welfare state" described by Christopher Howard in Ti-iE
HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1997). Howard's definition of the "hidden welfare state" includes all
tax expenditures with social welfare objectives, meaning those that parallel
direct expenditures for income security, health care, employment and train-
ing, housing, social services, education, and veterans' benefits. Familiar ex-
amples include tax deductions for home mortgage interest and charitable
contributions. Altogether, tax expenditures with social welfare objectives
cost approximately $400 billion in 1995.
Id. at 3.
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cident to employment, employers provide workers and their families
with a wide variety of essential welfare benefits, including health, disa-
bility, and retirement benefits. Thus, in addition to its role in the in-
ternal redistribution of cash income, the family acts as a conduit for
benefits from the employee welfare state. Although the state is not
involved as a direct provider in the employee welfare state, it under-
writes employee benefit plans with generous tax subsidies conditioned
upon employer maintenance of the essential social welfare chracter
of the benefit plan, by adherence to nondiscrimination rules that de-
ter employers from providing superior benefits to highly compensated
employees. 8
Finally, and far less so than in most other Western countries, the
state acts as a direct provider of social welfare. Direct provision is
largely limited to categorical programs designed to operate, at most,
as a safety net for certain classes of persons whose basic needs are not
otherwise adequately met.9
This Essay traces the various and diverse strands of the develop-
ing law of cohabitation, with particular attention to their relationship
to the American welfare state. The unusual character of the American
welfare state tends to explain one noteworthy American develop-
ment-employer extension of employment-related benefits to the
nonmarital domestic partners of employees. The nature of the Ameri-
can welfare state may also explain why the United States has been
comparatively slow to recognize that cohabitants who claim and enjoy
the benefits of marriage should also be expected to bear the burdens
of marriage. The narrative of this Essay additionally uncovers two re-
lated themes. The first is the extent to which a relatively small sub-
group of cohabitants-same-sex partners-spurred the movement to
regularize nonmarital cohabitation. In the United States, same-sex
couples are currently less than half as frequent as unmarried opposite-
sex couples, 10 and the number of same-sex couples is relatively con-
stant, while the number of unmarried opposite-sex couples is ever-
8 See I.RC. § 410(b) (1994).
9 The most prominent categorical assistance programs are Supplemental Secur-
ity Income (SSI), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383(d) (1994), which provides benefits to ie
indigent aged and disabled, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TiNF),
id. §§ 601-617 (Supp. IV 1999), which replaced Aid to Families With Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC), id. (1994).
10 In 1998, Census Bureau data show 55,303,000 married couples and 5,910,000
unmarried couples. Of the unmarried couples, 4,236,000 were opposite-sex couples,
and 1,674,000 were same-sex couples. Stated othermise, there were eleven unmarried
couples for every 100 married couples. Of the eleven unmarried couples, eight were
opposite-sex couples, and three were same-sex couples. &e infra note 11, chart 2.
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increasing. 1 Nevertheless, in the United States, same-sex couples
11 The number of unmarried, opposite-sex couples rose eight-fold from 1970 to
1998. The Census Bureau did not begin to collect data on same-sex couples until
1990. The same-sex couple figures from 1994 to 1998 are relatively flat. Indeed, they
show a slight decline in numbers (from 1,678,000 to 1,674,000). By contrast, the
number of opposite-sex couples increased by sixteen percent during the same four-
year period (from 3,661,000 to 4,236,000).
In 1998, there were eight unmarried opposite-sex couples for every 100 married
couples, up from one per 100 in 1970. More than one-third of these unmarried
couples had a child under fifteen years of age in their household. The change is
shown in the following table, taken from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULA-
TION REPORTS, SERIES P20-514, UNPUBLISHED TABLEs-MARITAL STATUS AND LIViNG AR.
RANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) 71-73 tbl.8 (1998), at http://www.census.gov/
prod/99pubs/p20-514u.pdf (last visited August 30, 2001) (containing corrected and
updated data through 1998 for information originally found in BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, CuRRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20-484, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING AR-
RANGEMENTS: MARCH 1994 (1996)).
TABLE A-8
UNMARRIED CouPLE HOUSEHOLDS, BY PRESENCE OF CHILDREN:
1970-1994 (1998)
Unmarried
Total Couples Per 100
Year Married Couples Unmarried Couples Married Couples
Without With
Children Children
Total Under 15 Under 15
1998 55,303,000 4,236,000 2,716,000 1,520,000 8
1994 54,261,000 3,661,000 2,391,000 1,270,000 7
1990 53,256,000 2,856,000 1,966,000 891,000 5
1985 51,114,000 1,983,000 1,380,000 603,000 4
1980 49,714,000 1,589,000 1,159,000 143,000 3
1970 44,593,000 523,000 327,000 196,000 1
In 1990, the Census Bureau began collecting data on same-sex couples (as opposed to







Couples Per Same-Sex Total Unmarried
100 Married Couples Per 100 Couples Per 100
Couples Married Couples Married Couples
Opposite- Same-
Sex Sex Total
1998 55,303 4,236 1,674 5,910 4 3 11
1996 54,667 3,958 1,684 5,642 7 3 10
1994 54,261 3,661 1,678 5,339 7 3 10
hi; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P20-496, UNPUn
usrn TAB.Es-MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1996 (UPDATE)
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have been the dominant force in the movement to regularize
nonmarital cohabitation.
The second theme concerns the relationship between the private
and the public sectors. In the United States, the government, particu-
larly the federal government, often leads the way in claims to equal
treatment and social justice, frequently by statutory regulation of a
recalcitrant private sector.1 2 However, customary roles have been re-
versed in the case of cohabitation. While the federal government leg-
islated "in defense of marriage,"13 private sector employers were
extending family benefits, previously limited to lawfully married
spouses of employees, to same-sex partners and sometimes to
nonmarital opposite-sex partners as well.14 Similarly, family benefits
granted to an employee's step-children (that is, the children of the
employee's spouse) were also frequently extended to the children of
an employee's same-sex or opposite-sex partner.15
These two secondary themes are largely local; they are particular
aspects of the American regularization of cohabitation. The larger
theme is comparative in scope. It examines the connection between
the law regulating the obligations of family members to one another
71-73 tbl.8 (1998), at http://vwv.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/p2-496u.pdf (last 'is-
ited August 30, 2001); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CuRRENT POPUL,%TION RErorrs, SEIES
P20-484, AR.rruAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEIENTS: AARCH 1994 at 71-73 tbl.8
(1996), available at http://wv.census.gov/prod//pop/p2484.pdf (last visited Au-
gust 30, 2001). Same-sex couples are almost half as frequent as unmarried opposite-
sex couples. At any given time, nearly half of gay men and more than half of lesbians
report themselves in a relationship with a primary partner, and many of these have
exchanged rings or othenvise engaged in a commitment ceremony. See sources cited
in David L Chambers, What I? The Legal Consequences of Mlarriage and the Legal Needs of
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MicH. L RE%. 447, 449 nn.3-6 (1996).
12 See, e.g., Education Amendments of 1972, tit. 9, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)
(prohibiting sex discrimination in any education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994) (prohibiting sex-
based wage discrimination); Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17
(1994) (prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis or race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national origin).
13 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that states are
not required to recognize sister state same-sex marriages) and 1 U.S.C. § 37 (Supp. IV
1999) (providing that the federal government does not recognize same-sex mar-
riages)). The enactment of DOMA was prompted by Baehr v. Leuin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993), and Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Ham Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996), affd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). Baehrv. Lxewin is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 36-43.
14 See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
15 The University of California plan, described iifta at notes 82-101 and accom-
panying text, is illustrative. See infra note 92.
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and the state's historical and cultural role as a primary provider or
secondary guarantor of social welfare. It explores the relationship be-
tween growing pressures on the welfare state (largely resulting in the
decline of the welfare state) and the development of a facially robust
private law of rights and responsibilities at divorce and at the termina-
tion of opposite-sex and same-sex nonmarital cohabitation. This rela-
tionship is evidenced in countries that are culturally closest to the
United States, such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and England.
In these countries, the trend has been to privatize economic obliga-
tions, that is, to substitute property division and family support obliga-
tions for public social security.16 The substitutionary role of private
law ultimately paves the way for uniform inclusion of all cohabiting
couples, whether formally married or not.17 Unlike most other devel-
oped countries, the United States has never committed itself to the
comprehensive goals of a fully developed welfare state. Consequently,
it is not ordinarily thought to be the role of government to guarantee
the social welfare of the citizenry.' 8 This perspective may affect the
way that the United States has conceptualized and rationalized family
16 For accounts of changing child support policy in England, seeJane Lewis, Fain-
ily Policy in the Post-war Period, in CROSS CuRRENTrs: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE US
AND ENGLAND 81, 94-100 (Sanford N. Katz et al. eds., 2000), and Mavis Maclean, Dce-
galized Family Obligations, in FAMILY LAW AND FAMILY PoucY IN THnE NEw EUROPE 129,
130-36 (Jacek Kurczewski & Mavis Maclean eds., 1997). For a contrasting account of
American law, see Barry L. Friedman & Martin Rein, The Evolution of Family Policy in
the United States after World War II, in CRoss CuRRENTs: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE
US AND ENGLAND, supra, at 101, 110-11.
17 Writing about property division and spousal support in England, John Eeke-
laar observes:
As far as the law on financial provision is concerned, the disjuncture be-
tween the formal basis of the law (dissolution of marriage) and its underly-
ing substance (sharing of resources acquired during a failed common
enterprise-specifically the task of beginning to bring up a child) seems to
be becoming more visible. The extension of the substance in due course to
unmarried cohabitants who also have children seems irresistible.
John Eckelaar, Post-divorce Financial Obligations, in CROSS CuRRENTrs: FANILY LAW AND
POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND, supra note 16, at 405, 421.
Although England has not systematically applied its marriage laws to cohabitants,
Gillian Douglas observes:
Two basic approaches can be discerned. The first was to give cohabitation
some recognition as a distinct status, and to equate it with marriage by giving
to cohabitants the same legal benefits and burdens that are given to spouses.
Gillian Douglas, Marriage, Cohabitation, and Parenthood-From Contract to Status, in
CROSS CuRRENTs: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE US AND ENGLAND, supra note 16, at
211, 213. Those benefits and burdens include entitlement to succeed to a tenancy, to
claim provision from a decedent's estate, and to wrongful death benefits. Id.
18 See Friedman & Rein, supra note 16, at 111-21.
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law obligations, as compared to countries that have experienced the
content and ethos of a more fully realized public welfare state.19 Spe-
cifically, differing perspectives may explain significant differences be-
tween the United States and our cultural cousins in the legal
treatment of nonmarital cohabitation.
I approach this subject as a legal scholar who, in the course of
professional life, has also participated in two of the legal develop-
ments discussed in this Essay- the extension of health benefits to em-
ployees' same-sex domestic partners and the drafting of the American
Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution chapter on the
inter se obligations of nonmarital cohabitants. I am not directly af&
fected by any of these developments. Instead, I am a long-married
spouse and parent who has had the better part of a lifetime to reflect
on the family and its myriad legal incidents and, consequently, to feel
concern for others who live in family circumstances indistinguishable
from those of my family but, through happenstance or legal disability,
may nevertheless be denied the protective cover of the lawfully consti-
tuted family. Additionally, I am a long-time participant in the govern-
ance of an elaborate employee welfare scheme and, together with my
family, a beneficiary of that scheme. In both capacities, I have fre-
quent occasion to feel concern for those who are similarly situated,
but for various reasons do not enjoy the protective cover of my partic-
ular employee welfare state.
I. SORTING THE VARIOUS STRANDS OF THE DEVELOPING LVW
OF COHABrrATION
The law and social treatment of cohabitation has been develop-
ing in a number of diverse ways, so that it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to broach any aspect of the subject without first carefully
specifying and cabining the precise topic of discussion. Ultimately,
there may be an underlying coherence and a unifying set of issues, but
the possibility of confusion is sufficiently great to require an initial
sorting of those different developments.
The diverse strands of the legal regulation of nonmarital cohabi-
tation can be organized in various ways. For purposes of the themes
of this Essay, I employ the organizational rubric of "rights and respon-
sibilities." Of course, in any reciprocal relationship, one party's right
may be the other's responsibility. Nevertheless, aspects of the move-
19 See Guy STANDING, GLOBAL LABOUR FLE-XIBILrrr SEEING DLnBtuTmnJusTcE
251-91 (1999); LouAs TsouKAus, THE NEv EuROPEAN EcoNo. w RE'isrVIE 114-37
(1997). See generally EuROPEAN SOctAL PoLicy. BEnwr.-N FR GME nWn ANT D INTEur,.
TION (Stephan Liebfried & Paul Pierson eds., 1995).
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ment to regularize cohabitation may helpfully be understood as initia-
tives either to acquire rights or, contradistinctively, to assign
responsibilities. Not surprisingly, it is usually individuals who seek to
establish fights and the state that seeks to assign responsibilities.
In marriage, rights and benefits accrue to the parties during their
relationship by virtue of their marital status. Although the parties
nominally have legal obligations to each other during an ongoing
marriage, those obligations largely go unnoticed because they are con-
sistent with ordinary spousal behavior in the course of the parties' life
together. At dissolution of the relationship, particularly at dissolution
by divorce, those obligations take on significance in the allocation of
property and the duty to pay child support and spousal support. Al-
though there is ordinarily a temporal disjunction between a spouse's
experience of the rights and obligations of lawful marriage, marriage
may be understood as a package, variously conferring benefits and
burdens upon persons who make a life together.
The first and most widely reported strand is the creation of a new
legal status that falls short of marriage, but that entails some of the
public rights and benefits of marriage. This status is often called "do-
mestic partnership." The intended beneficiaries of this status are
largely same-sex couples who are not eligible to marry, although in
some instances the opportunity has also been made available to oppo-
site-sex couples. This development is embodied in state and munici-
pal domestic partnership statutes, which define the incidents of
domestic partnership and allow couples to register as domestic part-
ners. Denmark enacted comprehensive domestic partnership legisla-
tion in 1989, and similar legislation was subsequently adopted by
many other western European countries. In the United States, domes-
tic partnership legislation has been quite modest, except in Vermont
and Hawaii, where broad-sweeping legislation has been required or
impelled by successful equal protection litigation.
The second strand, which has been less commented upon than
any other but has considerable strength in the United States, is the
extension to nonmarital cohabitants of private rights and benefits his-
torically enjoyed only by married persons. This trend has been most
noteworthy in the employer-employee relationship, where many em-
ployers have extended family benefits to the domestic partners of
their employees. For this purpose, employers generally require a dec-
laration that the parties live together and assume some sort of mutual
responsibility for each other. Extension of employment benefits to
domestic partners is more meaningful in the United States than it
would be in some other Western countries, because in the United
States much basic social security is provided as an aspect of employ-
[VOL. 76:51272
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ment compensation. Employment-based social security often provides
not only for the employee alone, but also for family members with
whom the employee shares a household.20 This is most notably and
distinctively true of health care and old-age pensions.
The third strand, and the one that has the longest legal history,
both here and abroad, is the legal obligation that one nonmarital
partner may have to the other at the dissolution of their relationship
by death or inter vivos separation. This is the subject of the contract
rubric expressed by Marvin and its progeny.21 Otherjurisdictions and
authorities have taken the path of status rather than contract; that is,
they treat persons who live together in stable marriage-like cohabita-
tion as though they are married, despite the absence of the legal for-
malities of marriage. The latter approach is expressed in the case law
of Washington State, 22 the legislation of other countries,2 and the
American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissohtion.2 4
The first two strands can be understood as claims to equal access
to rights and benefits generally accorded to married persons. In re-
questing the extension of benefits to nonmarital cohabitants, an em-
ployee who resides with a nonmarital cohabitant is making a claim to
equal treatment with a co-worker who resides with a lawful spouse.
Similarly, the domestic partnership movement is intended to secure as
many of the incidents of marriage as the state is willing, or constitu-
tionally compelled, 25 to allow. Each development requires that claim-
ants affirmatively assert and acknowledge their relationship as
nonmarital cohabitants. The stronger form of affirmation is domestic
partnership legislation, which requires that persons register formally
as domestic partners. Employers generally require some weaker form
of affirmation.
Parties registering as domestic partners seek to identify them-
selves as such and to obtain rights and benefits that accompany that
status. Although some domestic partnership statutes may also impose
inter se and third-party (creditor) obligations,2 6 the enrolling parties
20 It sometimes even provides for family members with whom the worker does
not share a household, such as children from a prior marriage who reside ith the
other parent.
21 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
22 See infra note 105.
23 See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
24 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DissoLrrION: ANALsYs AND REcoMEND.A-
TiONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALI PINCIPLES (Tentative Draft
2000)].
25 See infra Part MA
26 See, ag., infra text accompanying note 65.
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are likely to see these obligations as incidental, remote, and contin-
gent, much as persons entering marriage generally view the possibility
of post-dissolution obligations. This is even more the case with em-
ployee benefits, where the employee claiming benefits for a
nonmarital partner is generally required only to attest to the existence
of the relationship, that is, to the fact of sharing a household with a
nonmarital partner in some measure of economic interdependence.
2 7
Employee benefits represent, most clearly, a right or benefit without
any corresponding obligation running from one cohabitant to the
other.2
8
Unlike the first two developments, the third strand, traditionally
operative at the dissolution of the relationship by death or separation,
entails inter se claims, that is, claims by one party against the other.
One party is asserting a right and, if the right is recognized, the other
party may experience a corresponding responsibility or burden. I
shall therefore refer to this third area as the "responsibilities" strand
in that it has the effect of imposing responsibilities upon persons who
might not otherwise voluntarily undertake them. This is the strand
addressed by Marvin and by alternative status-based treatments. It
does not require or depend on any affirmative registration as domes-
tic partners, but instead looks to the parties' inter se behavior, either
contractual in the Marvin rubric or social in the status rubric.
Although these three strands are distinct, they are not unrelated.
For example, domestic partnership registration and declaration may
be treated as some evidence of the parties' social relationship, for the
purpose of imposing obligations, either contractual or status-based,
under the third strand of cohabitation doctrine.2 9 More importantly,
27 See, for example, the UCLA affidavit for same-sex cohabitants, reprinted infra
at text accompanying note 94.
28 The extension of employment-based benefits to the nonmarital partner of an
employee is not based on the rationale that the employee has any legal duty to sup-
port the nonmarital cohabitant, for the employee ordinarily does not. (By contrast,
this is a frequent rationale for the extension of public and private benefits to family
members of an employee. From this perspective, the equality claim is unavailing be-
cause the married employee and the cohabiting employee are not equally situated.
One owes a duty of support to his spouse; the other generally does not owe a duty of
support to his cohabitant.) Instead, the extension of benefits is more plausibly based
on the economics of a family household. Whether or not cohabitants who share a
household are legally bound to do so, they can be expected to provide each other
with support. This rationale also justifies the occasional extension of health benefits
to a dependent aged parent or adult child who resides with a covered employee. The
core notion is that any householder can reasonably be expected to support family
members with whom he or she shares the household.
29 See, e.g., ALI PmINcIpus (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24; § 6.03(7) 0).
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the coexistence of these three distinct strands raises issues about the
relationship between rights and responsibilities in the legal and social
regulation of cohabitation.
II. EQUALrIY CLAMS TO THE RIGHTS AND BENEFITs OF MARRIAGE
A. Equality Claims to Lawful Marriage and Domestic Partnership
The equality claim to the rights and benefits of laufuI marriage
began boldly, although unsuccessfully, in the early 1970s. In a series
of cases, state courts uniformly held that the restriction of marriage to
opppsite-sex partners posed no credible equal protection issues. 0 In
the two decades that followed, the organized gay and lesbian commu-
nity engaged in a spirited debate on whether it ought to seek access to
the status or incidents of marriage. Some took the view that gay per-
sons generally should not replicate constricting heterosexual institu-
tions and behavioral patterns, such as marriage and lifetime
commitment to another person, but should instead be free spirits in
an otherwise overly constrained society.3' Another view, agnostic or
even positive about long-term commitment, nevertheless disdained
marriage as an institution based on and embodying patriarchal privi-
lege, that is, as an institution that systematically oppresses women.32
(Not surprisingly, this perspective was more frequently espoused by
lesbians than by gay men.3 3 ) On the other hand, many same-sex
couples desired the regularization of their relationships as well as the
30 Se e.g.,Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. 1973) (rejecting the claim
of same-sex marriage applicants who invoked the constitutional rights of free exercise
of religion, freedom of association, and freedom to marry); Baker v. Nelson, 291
N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971) (rejecting same-sex marriage applicants' equal pro-
tection and due process claims); Singer v. Hats, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195-97 (Wash. Cit.
App. 1974) (rejecting the claim of same-sex marriage applicants despite an equal
rights amendment to the state constitution). For contemporaneous commentary, see
Comment, The Legaliy of Homosexual Marriage, 82 Yu. LJ. 573, 574-83 (1972), and
Note, Homosexuals'Right to Maly: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U.
PA. L RE V. 193, 197-213 (1979).
31 See generally, ag., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since Illzen Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,
OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9.
32 See, eg., Nancy D. Polikoff, Ie WIMl Get 117at IWe Ask Bor I7ay Legalizing Gqrj and
Lesbian Marriage Wdl Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in E ver Moariage," 79
VA. L. REv. 1535, 1536 (1993).
33 SeeWxu. i N. ESKRmDE, JR., THE CASE FOR S.%ME-sEX M, ,RRIO.: FROM SExU ,u
LmERwv To Crvusna_ Coimrrnr'r 75-77 (1996); Thomas B. Stoddard, 179y Gay People
Should Seek the Right to Many, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9, 10-13. But see Steven K.
Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARv C.R.-C.L L RE% 505, 530 (1994). See gener-
ally ADRm.v SuuVAN, VIRTUALLY Noatu.: AN ARUcMErr ABoUT Ho.tosEw-un, rv
(1995).
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various rights and benefits that accrue to married persons from mari-
tal status.34 Ultimately, the latter view prevailed. Lambda Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, the legal arm of the organized gay and
lesbian movement, pursued litigation in Hawaii, an historically toler-
ant state with a liberal supreme court. The strategy was to secure law-
ful same-sex marriage in one or more hospitable states. Same-sex
residents of other states could then lawfully contract marriages in one
of those hospitable states and, arguably, rely on ordinary choice-of-law
principles to secure legal recognition of their same-sex marriage in
their home states.35
34 See sources cited supra notes 31-33. On the face of it, the pro argument was
more powerful than the con argument in the sense that mere guarantee of access
does not require participation in a legal institution. Even with access to the status or
incidents of marriage, gays and lesbians could still choose to decline both as well as
long-term monogamous relationships. However, the movement to regularize same-
sex cohabitation, once undertaken, is likely to reach the relationships of members of
the anti-regulation group as well. See infra Part III.
35 According to the Restatement,
A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage
was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the
strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relation-
ship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.
REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNrar OF LAws § 283(2) (1971). The strong public
policy provision generally comes into play when the marriage would violate some
criminal law of the state. In most American states, same-sex marriage would not vio-
late any criminal law.
This choice-of-law principle would ordinarily apply even though the home state
would not itself allow the parties to contract a same-sex marriage in the home state.
After the early same-sex marriage cases of the 1970s, a number of states redrafted
their marriage statutes to specify that a marriage may only be contracted between a
man and a woman. See, for example, CAL. FAM. CODE § 306 (West 1994), which de-'
fines marriage as "a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man
and a woman." In 1977, the California legislature added the words "between a man
and a woman" to signify that same-sex couples cannot be lawfully married in Califor-
nia. See 1977 Cal. Stat. 339. Nevertheless, California courts ordinarily recognize a
marriage lawfully contracted in anotherjurisdiction, even though the marriage would
not satisfy California marriage requirements if it were contracted in California. Call-
fornia courts regularly recognize, for example, common-law marriages validly con-
tracted elsewhere, even though California abolished common-law marriage in 1895
and therefore would not recognize a purported common-law marriage contracted in
California after that date. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smyklo, 226 Cal. Rptr. 174 (Ct.
App. 1986) (recognizing an Alabama common-law marriage). To obviate the possibil-
ity that California courts might recognize same-sex marriages contracted elsewhere,
the California electorate approved Proposition 22 in March 2000. SeeJenifer Warren,
Proposition 22: Ban on Gay Marriages Wins in All Regions but Bay Area, L.A. TMEs, Mar. 8,
2000, at A23.
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Invoking the Equal Protection Clause of the Hawaii Constitution,
in Baehr v. Lewin,36 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the state must
satisfy the very highest standard of constitutional review, "the strict
scrutiny standard," in order to justify restricting marriage to opposite-
sex couples.37 Entirely avoiding discussion of sexual orientation, the
Hawaii Supreme Court characterized the issue as one of simple sex
discrimination: persons of one sex are denied the right to marry per-
sons of that sex, a right accorded to persons of the other sex.3 On
remand to the trial court, the State failed to meet the heavy constitu-
tional" burden; thus, the State of Hawaii was required to make mar-
riage equally available to gay and lesbian couples.3 9 However, the
voters of Hawaii subsequently authorized their legislature to amend
the state constitution to overrule Baehrinsofar as it required Hawaii to
recognize same-sex marriage. 40 As an apparent quid pro quo, the Ha-
waii legislature provided "reciprocal beneficiary" legislation for per-
sons legally unable to marry. In a move as oblique as the sex
discrimination rationale of Baehr, the Hawaii legislature side-stepped
the issue of same-sex relationships by extending relief to any two un-
married individuals legally prohibited from marrying each other
under state law.41 The legislative findings refer to brothers and sisters,
a widowed mother and her unmarried son, and, finally, "two individu-
als who are of the same gender."42 The effect of the Hawaii legislation
is to extend to same-sex couples some of the third-party benefits avail-
able to married couples, such as eligibility for derivative health insur-
ance coverage for family members, hospital visitation privileges,
wrongful death and loss of consortium claims, family and funeral
leave from employment, and state employee pension rights and death
36 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
37 Id. at 67.
38 Id. at 64. The court found inspiration in Lotting v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967), which may be understood to give a similar reading to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Striking dowm Virginia's anti.miscegenation
laws on the grounds of equal protection and substantive due process, the United
States Supreme Court rejected Virginia's argument that its prohibition of interracial
marriages satisfied the Equal Protection Clause because it treated all races equally in
that no person of one race was allowed to marry a person of another race. Id. at 8.
39 Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3,
1996), afJ'd, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. Dec. 3, 1997).
40 SeefDeb Price, Eekdions Rect RepublicanExtremism, DrR-orr NmEvs, No. 9, 1998,
at All.
41 HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 572C-1 to -7 (Michie 1999).
42 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 383, (H.B. 118) § 2. Even so, the legislation appears
to have been controversial. It became law without the Governor's signature. &relHmw.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 572C-2.
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benefits. The legislation includes reciprocal beneficiaries as spouses
for state heirship and elective share legislation and the pretermitted
spouse statute.43 Despite recognizing claims of one reciprocal benefi-
ciary against another when their relationship ends at death, the Ha-
waii legislation creates no claims at inter vivos termination of the
relationship. This gap is understandable in view of the broad scope of
the legislation. One would not want to impose continuing obliga-
tions, for example, upon an unmarried son who, in order to marry,
terminates a reciprocal beneficiary relationship with his mother.
However, the nature of the relationship between persons who cannot
marry because of consanguinity and the relationship of persons who
cannot marry because they are of the same sex is, or at least should be,
distinctly different. An unmarried person who has access to benefits
may commendably wish to share them with a less fortunate blood rela-
tive. That unmarried person should be able to terminate the relation-
ship to the less fortunate relative without continuing obligation. On
the other hand, same-sex partners who register as reciprocal benefi-
ciaries are much more likely to be indistinguishable from opposite-sex
couples who marry. Their relationship may include children as well as
a much greater degree of financial interdependence than is likely in
the case of reciprocal beneficiaries who are blood relatives. Thus, Ha-
waii's oblique treatment is one that is not fully satisfactory to persons
other jurisdictions would characterize as "domestic partners."
The campaign for gay and lesbian marriage next looked to Ver-
mont. The Vermont Constitution includes a "common benefit"
clause, which provides that the government is "instituted for the com-
mon benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or com-
munity, and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any
single person, family, or set of persons, who are a part only of that
community."44 In Baker v. State,45 the Vermont Supreme Court held
that the common benefit clause was violated by Vermont's exclusion
of same-sex couples from the benefits and protections that Vermont
provides to opposite-sex married couples. 46 The court concluded that
the Vermont legislature had two options: it could extend the status of
marriage to same-sex couples; or it could extend to same-sex couples
the benefits and protections provided to married couples. 47 The legis-
43 See HAv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-3 to -7.
44 VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 7.
45 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
46 Id. at 886.
47 Id.
1278 [VOL- 76:5
2001J THE REGULARIZATION OF NONMARITAL COHABITATION
lature chose the second option, enacting comprehensive domestic
partnership legislation for same-sex couples.
The Vermont legislation creates legal parity, to the extent state
law alone can do so, between married couples and same-sex couples
who enter a legally regulated "civil union."48 The legislation extends
all the state law rights and obligations of marriage to a civil union of
same-sex partners.4 9 The substantive and procedural requirements of
entry are the same for marriages and civil unions.50 Relationships may
not be incestuous5l or bigamous and must be duly licensed, ceremoni-
alized, and registered.5 2 The dissolution of either is adjudicated in
family court, where marital rights and obligations apply equally to
marriages and civil unions.53 Parties to a civil union are treated
equally with spouses with respect to death rights, wrongful death ac-
tions, adoption law and procedure, group insurance for state employ-
ees, spousal abuse programs, workers' compensation benefits, family
leave benefits, state and municipal taxes, the laws determining the
parenthood of children born during the relationship of the parties,
and a host of lesser incidents of marriage.54 The legislation also regu-
lates insurers. Any insurance policy that provides coverage to married
couples, spouses, and families must provide equivalent coverage for
parties to a civil union and their families.55 The Vermont legislation
recognizes that parties to a Vermont civil union will not be treated
equally with spouses under federal income tax and estate tax law.50
However, for Vermont income tax purposes, the legislation treats par-
ties to a civil union as though federal income tax law recognizes a civil
union in the same manner as Vermont law.5 7 The legislation also con-
forms the Vermont estate tax to federal law.58
From the point of view of family law, the distinction between a
full-blown civil partnership, such as Vermont's civil union, and a law-
48 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 1999 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (codified in scat-
tered sections of VT. ST. ANN.).
49 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204 (2000).
50 Id. § 1202; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5160-5169 (2000).
51 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1203. Compare the Havaii legislation, which requires
ineligibility to marry on account of, inter alia, consanguinity. The Haiwii legislation
may be read, darkly, to foster domestic relationships that, if they become sexual,
would violate Hawaii's incest laws. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5720-4 (Michie 1999).
52 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5160-5169.
53 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1206.
54 Id. § 1204.
55 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4063a (2000).
56 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7401(a) (2000).
57 Id. §§ 3001, 5812.
58 See id §§ 3001, 5812, 7401(a).
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ful marriage is merely symbolic. In law, marriage is simply the sum of
its legal incidents. However, from the perspective of religion and so-
cial psychology, there are other dimensions to marriage. The mainte-
nance of marriage as an exclusively heterosexual opportunity appears
to have important symbolic meaning for persons who are nevertheless
amenable to the notion of domestic partnership for same-sex
couples.5
9
Although no other American legislation has matched the scope
of the Vermont civil union statute, one state60 and many municipali-
ties 1 have enacted domestic partnership legislation. California, for
example, permits state registration of "domestAic partnerships" com-
posed of two unmarried adults who are either of the same sex or, if
they are of the opposite sex, are over the age of sixty-two and qualify
for social security benefits. 62 Partners must share a common resi-
dence, agree to be jointly responsible for basic living expenses in-
curred by either of them during their relationship, and file a
declaration of domestic relationship with the Secretary of State. 3 The
legislation includes provisions for registering and terminating domes-
tic partnerships. 64 Registration creates potential liability to creditors
and a few basic rights. 65 Health facilities must treat a domestic part-
ner and the children of a domestic partner as family members for
purposes of hospital visitation.66 The legislation also amends the Gov-
ernment Code to authorize state and local government employers to
offer health care coverage and related benefits to the domestic part-
ners of state and local government employees. 67 This legislation may
59 California, for example, enacted relatively modest domestic partnership legis-
lation before the voters approved Proposition 22, which provides that California will
not recognize same-sex marriages lawfully contracted elsewhere. See 1999 Cal. Stat.
588. The proponents of Proposition 22 emphasized that they did not oppose domes-
tic partnership legislation; their goal was merely to preserve the special status of mar-
riage for opposite-sex couples alone. See David 0. Coolidge, Marriage Is Not Meant for
Same-Sex Couples, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2000, at B5.
60 See text accompanying infra notes 61-68.
61 See Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal
and SocialAnalysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. Rv. 1164, 1188-92
(1992) (discussing the municipal ordinances).





67 See id. (adding CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2001), CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 22867 (West Supp. 2001), and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1261 (West 2000)).
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be understood as California's first step in extending some of the rights
and obligations of marriage to domestic partners.8
The gay and lesbian initiative for same-sex marriage has not yet
accomplished its ambitious constitutional and choice-of-law project.
However, law and society have not responded with offhand rejection,
as they did to the constitutional litigation of the early seventies.6 9 In-
stead, they effectively made a counter-proposal of domestic partner-
ship. This process was evidenced most dramatically in the test state of
Vermont. In Vermont, the state supreme court gave the legislature a
choice between marriage and substantially equivalent domestic part-
nership,70 and the legislature opted for the latter.71 Jurisdictions that
were not challenged by successful constitutional litigation have
tended to adopt weaker forms of domestic partnership legislation,
often relatively ad hoc in nature.72
In contrast, strong domestic partnership legislation has been ex-
tensive in Western Europe. Some countries have introduced regis-
tered partnership for same-sex couples only (Denmark, Nonvay,
Sweden, and Iceland). Others have introduced registered partnership
for all couples (Netherlands, France, and the Spanish provinces of
Catalunya and Aragon). In most European countries, partnership re-
gistration has almost all of the consequences of marriage, except for
68 See, for example, A.B. 25, 2001-02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001), which would
extend the following rights historically reserved for spouses to registered domestic
partners: derivative tort claims, including loss of consortium and %%rongful death
claims; right to make medical treatment decisions for each oher;, exension of deriva-
tive group health insurance to the domestic partners of subscribers on the same terms
normally provided for a subscriber's dependents; extension of sick leave, when pro-
vided to an employee to care for a spouse or child, to the provision of care for an
employee's domestic partner or child of a domestic partner;, extension of spousal con-
servatorship rules to domestic partners; extension of statutory will, intestacy rights,
and administration rights to domestic partners; exclusion from taxable income,
under California income tax law, of employer-provided health insurance for a domes-
tic partner of an employee (an exclusion not allowed by federal income tax law, see
infra note 87); and, for purposes of eligibility for unemployment compensation bene-
fits, "good cause" for leaving employment includes accompanying one's domestic
partner to a new location.
Assembly Bill 25 is the "modest" bill. The more expansive A.B. 1338, 2001-02
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001), would follow the Vermont model, se text accompanying
supra notes 48-58, and create a civil union status that provides all the rights and
obligations of marriage.
69 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
70 Se Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
71 See An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 1999 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (codified in
scattered sections of VT. STAT. ANN.).
72 See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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rights pertaining to the adoption of children.73 These countries and
jurisdictions are, in historical order, Denmark (Danish Registered
Partnership Act, 1989); Norway (Norwegian Registered Partnership
Act of 1993); Sweden (1995); Iceland (1996); Greenland (1996);
Netherlands (1998); Catalunya, Spain (1998); Aragon, Spain (1999);
and France (PACS 1999).74
B. Equality Claims to Employment Benefits
Independently of any legislation or court action, and for that rea-
son generally less observed, American employers have increasingly
been treating nonmarital cohabitants equally with married persons for
purposes of employee benefits.7 The trend is particularly pro-
nounced with large corporations, 76 educational institutions, 77 and
73 From the American perspective, the European exclusion of lights pertaining
to the adoption of children is noteworthy. Even before the introduction of any no-
tion of domestic partnership, American law was relatively permissive on gay and les-
bian adoption of children, both with respect to children who were fully adoptable and
the children of a same-sex domestic partner. See sources cited in ALl PRINCIPLES
(Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 6.03, reporter's n. cmt. d.
74 The European statutes are collected in REcoGNISING SAME-SEx RELATIONSHIPS
11-16 (Law Commission of New Zealand, Study Paper 4, 1999).
75 In 1982, the Village Voice, a New York City weekly newspaper, became the first
employer to offer domestic partner benefits to gay and lesbian employees. In 1992,
Lotus Development Corporation became the first publicly traded company to offer
domestic partner benefits. A 1997 survey by KPMG Peat Marwick found that thirteen
percent of U.S. employers extended health care benefits to domestic partners. By
2001, more than 2500 public and private employers had extended health care bene-
fits to domestic partners. See Human Rights Campaign, Wat Are Domestic Partner Bene-
fits, at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/dp-whatisdp.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2001).
76 See id. The Human Rights Campaign reports that 116 of the Fortune 500 com-
panies offer domestic partner health benefits, including six of the top ten companies,
Human Rights Campaign, Fortune 500 Companies That Offer Domestic Partner Health Ben-
efits, at http://vvw.hrc.org/equalityatexxon/fortune.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2001).
Data on whether the benefits are extended only to same-sex partners or also to oppo-
site-sex domestic partners are incomplete. In companies for which such data are
available, approximately forty percent offer benefits to same-sex partners only; the
remaining sixty percent offer benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex domestic part-
ners. Id.
77 The Human Rights Campaign reports that 129 colleges and universities offer
domestic partner health benefits. Human Rights Campaign, Colleges and Universities
That Offer Domestic Partner Health Benefits, at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/index.asp
(last visited Feb. 22, 2001). Data on whether the benefits are extended only to same-
sex partners or also to opposite-sex domestic partners are incomplete. For colleges
and universities for which such data are available, approximately fifty-eight percent
offer benefits to same-sex partners only; the remaining forty-two percent offer bene-
fits to same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners. Id.
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state and municipal employers.78 The significance of this develop-
ment lies in the central role that employment benefits play in the
American welfare system. By welfare system, I mean not merely "wel-
fare" in the popular sense (public assistance), but rather the entire
structure of rights and obligations that secure the welfare of individu-
als and families in the United States.
After World War II, while other countries were establishing na-
tional health systems, American employers increasingly provided
health insurance as an employment benefit for workers and their fam-
ilies.79 Although this approach has been supplemented by relatively
limited public provisions for low-income families and the aged, 0 em-
ployment has persisted as the dominant source of health coverage,
and employment benefits have frequently been expanded to include
the full panoply of benefits usually associated with a highly developed
welfare state. Although the federal government is not the direct pro-
vider of such benefits, it supports them with significant tax subsidies
conditioned upon nondiscrimination rules intended, inter alia, to
achieve the social welfare goal of extending coverage to all an em-
ployer's employees, not just the highly compensated.81
To illustrate, I draw on my own experience as an observer-partici-
pant in the construction and maintenance of one such highly devel-
oped employee benefit plan and in its restructuring to extend family
benefits to nonmarital cohabitants. The University of California at
78 The Human Rights Campaign reports that ninety-eight state and local govern-
ments offer domestic partner health benefits. Human Rights Campaign, State and
Local Governments that Offer Domestic Partner Health Benefits, at http://wii-hrc.org/
worknet/index.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2001). Data on whether the benefits are ex-
tended only to same-sex partners or also to opposite-sex domestic partners are incom-
plete. For state and local governments for which such data are available,
approximately twenty-five percent offer benefits to same-sex partners onl) the re-
maining seventy-five percent offer benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex domestic
partners. Id State governments offering domestic partner health benefits to their
employees include California, Connecticut, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Wash-
ington. Id. Major cities include Albany, Albuquerque, Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago,
Denver, Gainesville, Iowa City, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia,
Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, Providence, Rochester, Sacramento, San Diego, San
Francisco, Santa Barbara, Seattle, and Tucson. Id.
79 See GoScnAtL, supra note 7, at 39-64.
80 These include the means-tested categorical public assistance programs that in-
clude a health care component (Medicaid), the Clinton-vra children's program for
health insurance, and OASDI (Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance), com-
monly called Social Security, with its companion Medicare program.
81 See I.R-C. § 410(b) (1994).
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Los Angeles (UCLA) employee benefits plan8 2 may rival even the
Swedish welfare state at its apogee. Employees are offered a menu of
health plans, starting with basic HMO plans that require no additional
employee contribution. More elaborate plans are also highly subsi-
dized and require only modest (pretax) monthly premiums. Dental
and vision plans are provided at no additional cost to the employee. A
richly endowed retirement plan provides, with no additional em-
ployee contribution, generous retirement and disability pensions.
Low-interest loans are available for employees who wish to purchase a
home. For the preschool children of employees, excellent on-site day
care is available at subsidized rates. For the older children of faculty
and staff, places are set aside in the University's subsidized model ele-
mentary school. Exercise facilities are available at nominal charge, as
is a complex of swimming pools and tennis courts intended for em-
ployees and their families. Employees and their spouses enjoy free or
reduced rate tuition in academic programs. Tuition waivers for the
children of employees are under consideration. There are additional
self-supporting programs in which employees can benefit from group
purchasing power or non-profit status, such as term life insurance, ad-
ditional disability insurance, a credit union, and even a car-purchasing
program. I mention only those benefits that are fully available to all
employees on a non-competitive basis and exclude those that are se-
lectively and competitively assigned for recruitment and retention,
such as substantial subsidies for local home purchase.
8 3
At UCLA, the issue of nonmarital cohabitation first arose with
health care plans and later with pension plans. The way in which the
issues were discussed by the members of the local faculty welfare com-
mittee sheds light on some of the tensions and ambiguities of em-
ployee benefit plans, which are often reflected in the design of the
plans themselves. Depending on the composition of the employee's
family and the employee's election, UCLA health insurance is either
provided for the employee, the employee and spouse, or the em-
ployee, spouse, and children. In the basic plans, each of the three
options is provided without additional payment. In the plans that re-
quire some additional payment, the amount of the payment increases,
but only slightly, with the number of family members covered. No
82 Some, but not all, of these benefits originate with the University of California
and are system-wide. This is true of the health plan. On the other hand, other bene-
fits, such as child care, primary education, and recreational facilities, are local.
83 These benefits run afoul of the nondiscrimination rules and thus do not re-
ceive favorable tax treatment. Most notably from the employee's perspective, they are
treated like cash income and their value is thus taxed to the employee. By contrast,
benefits that conform to the nondiscrimination rules are nontaxable to the employee.
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distinction is made on the basis of the number of children. Ten chil-
dren cost no more than one. Effectively, the level of subsidy increases
sharply as the size of the family grows. The structure of employee
health insurance thus seems to respond to the principle: to each em-
ployee according to his (his family's) needs. With health insurance,
single persons subsidize couples and families with children, childless
couples subsidize couples with children, and small families subsidize
large families. These cross-subsidies are consistent ith the initial
postwar decision that the employer-employee relationship, rather
than the state-individual relationship, would provide the platform for
the health care component of the American welfare system. In the
context of health care, the differential welfare subsidies seem gener-
ally accepted, or perhaps merely unnoticed. Indeed, a subsidy for nu-
merous children is common even in private, individually-purchased
health insurance plans.
On the other hand, there is a competing notion of equal com-
pensation for equal service. Employee compensation includes wages
and benefits.8 4 This sometimes gives rise to the claim that, because
benefits form part of the compensation package, all employees should
have a benefits package of equal value.85 In one sense, tie argument
84 It is frequently observed that employee benefits are part of a workers compen-
sation package. This is true in two respects. Employment is a precondition to bene-
fits, and net employer expenditure for benefits diminishes pro tanto the fund aa1%ilable
for wage compensation. However, that granted, employee benefits resemble welfare
benefits more than they do ordinary wage compensation. In the case of health cover-
age, for example, the value of the benefit to each employee varies according to the
family circumstances of the employee and the health of the employee and his deriva-
tive family beneficiaries. Income, whether cash or in-kind, is normally subject to the
personal income tax. However, the federal government exempts in-kind employee
benefits from income taxation,just as it ordinarily exempts need-based welfare bene-
fits provided by the state. (The Internal Revenue Service treats welfare payments as
nontaxable income. The service takes the view that such payments are not ithin the
contemplation of the I.R.C. § 61 definition of gross income. See Rev. Rul. 76-144,
1976-1 C.B. 17 (stating that disaster relief grants are not taxable income to recipi-
ents); Rev. Rul. 74-205, 1974-1 G.B. 20 (stating that the IRS has consistently held that
payments made under legislatively provided social benefit programs for promotion of
the general welfare are not includible in a recipient's gross income); Rev. Rul. 63-136,
1963-2 C.B. 12 (stating that cash benefits paid to persons undergoing on-the-job train-
ing in the Federal Manpower program are not taxable income to the recipients); Rev.
Rul. 57-102, 1957-1 C.B. 26 (stating that state welfare benefits for the blind are not
includible in the gross income of the recipients for federal income tax purposes).)
Given the lack of universal health coverage in the United States, the direction of this
tax subsidy is troubling. Effectively, those who do not have employer-provided group
health insurance subsidize those who do.
85 See, e.g.,James E. Donovan, An EthicalArgument to Restri Domestic Partnerships to
Same-Sex Coupes, 8 LAw & SFxuAur 649, 666 n.63 (1998) (reporting an e-mail com-
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seems questionable, for its proponents would not ordinarily assert that
all employees should receive equal wages, without regard to the value
of their services. Thus, the very premise of the claim, that all benefit
packages should have equal value regardless of the relative value of
each employee's services, suggests that benefits are different in char-
acter than wages, that is, that they are intended to serve welfare goals.
This view is reinforced by the generous federal tax subsidies for em-
ployee benefit plans and the nondiscrimination requirements for
those subsidies, which require that highly compensated employees not
be preferred in an employer's benefit scheme.8 6 Moreover, the fed-
eral government exempts qualifying in-kind employee benefits from
personal income taxation, 7 just as it ordinarily exempts need-based
welfare benefits provided by the state. 8
Nevertheless, the claim to a benefits package of equal value has
had some valence. It is expressed in the notion of a "menu" of bene-
fits from which an employee can choose according to his needs and
preferences, with the implicit suggestion, if not the assurance, that any
particular set of choices is equal in value to any other set of choices.
In health insurance, the claim to equality of benefits may implicitly be
expressed in those employer-provided health plans that insure the
worker alone and require the worker to contribute a full unsubsidized
premium for any other family members he wishes to cover. Although
there are other explanations for such a plan, including employer cost-
munication in which Suzanne Goldberg, staff attorney for Lamda Legal Defense and
Education Fund (LLDEF), explained that LLDEF supports inclusion of opposite-sex,
as well as same-sex, couples in domestic partnership plans on the ground that these
are largely -economic issues of equal compensation).
Alternatively, employees might claim that workers with equal wages should have
equal benefits; in other words, a worker's benefit package should correspond in value
to his wages. In other words, higher-wage employees should have better benefit pack-
ages. Federal anti-discrimination rules stifle this claim and, in doing so, shed light on
the role that benefits play in the national welfare scheme.
86 See I.RC. § 410(b) (1994).
87 However, the exemption from income taxation does not extend equally to ben-
efits provided for a domestic partner, as opposed to a spouse, of an employee. Under
federal income tax law, married employees may exclude spousal coverage from in-
come. Unmarried employees may only exclude the value of partner coverage if the
partner is a dependent of the employee. I.R.C. §§ 105(B), 106, 152 (1994 & Supp. V
1999); see also Lindsay Brooke King, Enforcing Conventional Morality Through Taxation?
Determining the Excludability of Employer-Provided Domestic Partner Benefits Under Sections
105(B) and 106 of the Internal Revenue Code, 53 WAsm. & LEE L. REV. 301, 303 (1996);
William V. Vetter, Restrictions on Equal Treatment of Unmarried Domestic Partners, 5 BU.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 5-12 (1995).
88 See sources cited supra note 84.
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cutting, they nevertheless express the principle that the employer is
subsidizing each employee's health insurance in equal measure.
In UCLA Faculty Welfare Committee deliberations, the "equality
of value" argument has recurrently been made, for example, ith re-
spect to proposals to expand the provision of subsidized University
day care and to introduce University of California tuition waivers for
the children of employees. "Why," childless faculty ask, "should I be
required to subsidize the care and education of other employees' chil-
dren?" 89 The answer, perhaps unsatisfactory to those who make the
equality-of-value argument, is that benefits are essentially welfare allo-
cations distributed on the basis of need. Under the welfare allocation
view, all employees, those who use a benefit such as day care and those
who do not, are ultimately equally situated because the non-users are
in any event wealthier in that they do not have to devote any portion
of their income to the purchase of (partially subsidized) child care.
Similarly, those whose poor health requires that they make extensive
use of their health coverage derive disproportionate value from that
coverage, but are ultimately no better off in terms of disposable wealth
than their healthier co-workers. Thus, the comprehensiveness of the
UCLA welfare benefits system tends to insure that all employees have
a substantially equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their Awage in-
come, and the salary scale for that wage income is, contradistinctively,
set to compensate each employee for the value of services rendered to
the University.
That employee benefits may simultaneously be interpreted by em-
ployees as in-kind equivalent for wage compensation and as employ-
ment-based social welfare has significance for the extension of
benefits to nonmarital cohabitants and for any analysis of the reci-
procity of rights and responsibilities. If benefits are predominantly
characterized in terms of their social welfare function, then the claim
of employees and their nonmarital partners to benefits is properly
based on the assertion that nonmarital partners are equally situated
with marital partners. That assertion was initially made with respect to
family health benefits by gay and lesbian employees, who complained
that they maintained households indistinguishable from marital
households, they would marry their partner if state law allowed them
to do so, and therefore their employer should treat them as though
they were married. Their claim to family health benefits was compel-
89 And then: "Why have the benefit at all? Why not let the market provide?" (Of
course, the follow-up objections would not be made about health care, from which all
stand to benefit, so I assume that the gravamen of these follow-up arguments is sim-
ply: "I don't stand to benefit at all.")
1287
1288 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 76:5
ling in view of the state law restriction of marriage to opposite-sex
couples. In the course of discussion, the UCLA Faculty Welfare Com-
mittee debated the inclusion of nonmarital opposite-sex couples. The
Committee concluded that opposite-sex couples should not be in-
cluded, because they could marry if they wished and thereby under-
take marital obligations to each other. Their failure to do so
undermined their claim to equality of treatment. In other words, they
should not be allowed to claim the benefits of marriage without as-
suming the responsibilities of marriage. 9° The Regents of the Univer-
sity of California apparently agreed on this point9 ' when, in 1997, they
extended family health benefits to same-sex domestic partners only.
9 2
For this purpose, same-sex domestic partners are required to join to-
90 Most notably in California, both spouses have "present, existing, and equal in-
terests" in the marital earnings of either spouse. CAL. FAm. CODE § 751 (West 1994).
Subsequently, the system-wide University of California Faculty Welfare Commit-
tee tried to piggy-back on the grant of health benefits to same-sex partners to obtain
further extension to opposite-sex partners. See UNIv. COMM. ON FACULTY WELFARE,
ACADEMIC SENATE, UNIV. OF CAL., ENSURING FULL EQUALITY IN BENEFITS FOR UC EMI.
PLOYEES WITH DoMEsnc PARTNERS 3 (1999) [hereinafter ENSURING FULL EQUALr1Y].
Failure to include the latter, it implied, is a form of prohibited discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and marital status. In other words, extension of health
benefits only to same-sex partners impermissibly discriminates against opposite-sex
partners on the basis of sexual orientation. And, allowing benefits for married per-
sons but not opposite-sex cohabitants discriminates against the latter on the basis of
marital status. Essentially, the argument was that the declaration required of same-sex
couples should also suffice for opposite-sex couples, and it is immaterial (i) that the
former cannot marry and the latter can and (ii) that the declaration required of
same-sex domestic partners encompasses rights and responsibilities far more limited
than those imposed by the law of marriage. Id.
91 1 leave aside the instrumental issues of recruitment and retention. Injustifying
their extension of health coverage to the same-sex partners of University of California
employees to Republican Governor Pete Wilson, who strongly opposed the move and
had appointed many of them, the Regents buttressed their equality rationale with the
need to compete with other leading universities that were already offering benefits to
same-sex partners. Recruitment and retention surely were issues for a state university
system that was somewhat late to join the trend. Moreover, the tight labor market of
the prosperous 1990s generally gave employers strong incentive to enhance (gener-
ally noninflationary) employee benefits as a means of attracting new employees. The
tight labor market may explain the rapid spread of same-sex partner benefits, but it
does not explain their genesis or their particular rationales.
92 The Academic Council, an advisory body to the Regents, took the opposite
position, recommending that the University of California provide health benefits to
opposite-sex partners as well. See ENSURING FULL EQUAITy, supra note 90.
The Regents extended health benefits to same-sex domestic partners on the same
terms that they offered to the families of married employees, that is to partners and
the dependent children of either partner.
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gether to execute the following affidavit (and may be required to pro-
duce evidence of its truth93):
1. We are each other's sole domestic partner and intend to remain
so indefinitely. We are in a relationship of mutual support, car-
ing, and commitment. We are financially interdependent.
2. We are of the same sex, neither one of us is legally married, and
we are not related by blood to a degree of closeness which would
prohibit legal marriage in the State of California.
3. We are at least 18 years of age and have the capacity to enter a
contract.
4. We have resided together for at least six months and intend to
reside together indefinitely.
5. It has been at least six months since the termination of a previ-
ous same-sex domestic partnership.
94 "
At the same time, the Regents also provided that an employee
who enrolls neither a spouse nor a same-sex domestic partner may
enroll an adult dependent relative who (i) resides with the employee,
(ii) is incapable under California law of marriage with the employee
because of the consanguineous relationship, and (iii) is claimed by
the employee as a tax dependent. 95 This provision may also be under-
stood as an equality-based welfare provision in that an employee who
resides with and assumes responsibility for an adult relative is similarly
situated, for health benefit purposes, to an employee who resides ith
a spouse or same-sex domestic partner. Although die employee is not
required to undertake any further obligation to the dependent rela-
tive, the moral obligation to care for family members, already made
manifest by the employee having taken de facto responsibility for the
dependent relative, serves as an effective substitute for marriage, in
the case of spouses, or the declaration and proof of domestic partner-
ship, in the case of same-sex nonmarital cohabitants.
93 An employee claiming same-sex partner health benefits must submit upon re-
quest proof of at least three of the following items:
joint mortgage or joint tenancy on a residential lease; joint bank account;
joint liabilities (e.g., credit cards or car loans);joint owmership of significant
property (e.g., cars); durable property or health care powers of attorney;
wills, life insurance policies or retirement annuities naming each other as
primary beneficiary; written agreements or contracts showing mutual sup-
port obligations or joint ownership of assets acquired during the
relationship.
UNIV. OF CAL., AFFADAVrr OF SAiME-SFx DoNmisrc PARTNERSHip OR ADULT DE.PEXtDL\-r
RELATIVE RELATIONsHIP 1-2 (2000), available at http://-ww.ucop.edtt/bencom/
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On the other hand, the eligibility structure also suggests some
concern about providing an "equal benefits package." From a welfare
perspective one might, for example, allow an employee to claim both
a spouse and another adult dependent relative residing with the em-
ployee. The University of California plan allows the possibility that
some married employees, whose spouses are otherwise covered and
thus do not require the employee's health insurance, might wish in-
stead to insure an adult dependent relative. An employee may do so,
but only if he dis-enrolls his spouse. In other words, an employee is
allowed to enroll only one adult beneficiary in the health plan, which
does suggest concern about providing an equal benefits package to
each employee.
The rights and responsibilities issue was presented much more
sharply in the claim (as yet unresolved) that same-sex domestic part-
ners should enjoy the UCLA subsidy for joint-and-survivor pension
benefits currently available only to married employees and their
spouses. 96 An employee may name any contingent annuitant, but or-
dinarily only at the cost of full actuarial reduction of the employee's
lifetime benefit.97 However, spousal contingent annuitants receive a
substantial subsidy that, depending on the plan, completely or par-
tially eliminates actuarial reduction of the married employee's life-
time benefit.
98
For family law purposes, health coverage and pensions are mark-
edly different in character. When a married employee divorces, his
former spouse is no longer eligible for employer-subsidized health
coverage. 99 Although a community, or marital, asset during marriage,
health insurance has no distributable value at divorce. By the terms of
the policy, the former spouse is excluded from coverage, and the em-
ployee continues to fund his now separate health insurance with his
post-divorce separate wages. Correspondingly, a same-sex domestic
partner's entitlement to health insurance ends at the termination of
the relationship with an employee. Thus, the extension of health in-
96 UNIV. OF CAL., RETIREMENT PLAN SUMMARY PLAN DEscaunoN 14-20 (2000),
available at http://www.ucop.edu/bencom/rs/ucrp.html (last modified July 27,
2001).
97 Id. at 17-18.
98 Id.
99 Federal law provides short-term relief for persons who have lost eligibility for
employer-provided group health insurance on account of certain qualifying events,
including divorce. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Amendment Act of 1985 (CO-
BRA) requires that the sponsors of ERISA-regulated group health insurance plans
offer an employee's divorced spouse thirty-six months of individual health insurance
continuation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1994). The sponsor may charge the divorced
spouse the full premium. Id.
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surance coverage does not raise marital or partnership termination
issues.
In contrast to health insurance, which provides current coverage,
pension contributions provide only deferred benefits. For this reason,
pensions are frequently described as "deferred compensation," and
marital property law classifies them as marital or separate property
according to when they were earned, not according to when benefits
are received. 100 Thus, in every American jurisdiction, divorcing
spouses have marital property claims to pension rights earned by ei-
ther spouse during marriage. (In California, spouses are entitled to
an equal division of the community property. 01) Therefore, married
University of California employees not only have greater earned pen-
sion rights, but also have an obligation to share pension rights earned
during marriage with a spouse in the event of divorce, a significant
obligation in a state in which a marriage is equally likely to end in
divorce as in death. (And in the case of nonmarital cohabitation, the
odds of pre-death dissolution are likely to be even greater.) This
raises the question whether employees can plausibly demand for
themselves and their same-sex domestic partners the subsidized joint-
and-survivor pensions enjoyed by married employees without also
agreeing to shoulder the obligation to share pension rights earned
during their relationship with a partner should the domestic partner-
ship end before death.
The "equal value of employee benefits" argument might be un-
derstood to support a "rights, but no responsibilities" claim by the em-
ployee who has a same-sex partner. In other words, "I am entitled to a
joint-and-survivor pension benefit of equal dollar value to my married
co-worker even though I have no post-termination responsibility to
share pension rights earned during our relationship with my domestic
partner." The welfare analysis would suggest, however, that the same-
sex claimant is entitled only if he is equally situated with respect to
pension benefits. He may arguably be during the continuance of the
100 For a national survey, see Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Propery Treatment of
Pensions, Disability Pay, Workes' Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance,
or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1250, 1256-66, 1290-98 (1986).
When the value of the pension is substantially related to the number of years of
service, a "time rule" is usually applied to determine the fractional marital interest in
the pension. The numerator is the number of years of service during the marriage,
and the denominator is the total number of years of service that contribute to the
value of the pension. See e.g., In re Marriage of Gowan, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 456-59
(Ct. App. 1997); In reMarriage of Poppe, 158 Cal. Rptr. 500, 503-04 (Ct. App. 1979).
101 See CA. FA _. CODE § 2550 (West 1994) (providing that "the court shall...
divide the community estate of the parties equally").
12 91
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
domestic partnership, when, in the course of ordinary domestic life,
he shares his income with his partner, but he is not at the inter vivos
dissolution of the partnership.
The University of California is not generally in the business of
determining how property interests should be distributed at the disso-
lution of a same-sex domestic partnership. (On the other hand, it
would not be a great extension of the same-sex domestic partnership
affidavit to require, as a prerequisite to the pension subsidy enjoyed by
married persons, that domestic partners agree that the non-employee
partner may claim a quasi-marital domestic partnership division of the
pension at the termination of their relationship.) To the extent that
the University declines to provide a scheme for pension distribution at
the termination of domestic partnerships and also understands the
marriage subsidy as a welfare subsidy reflecting the rights and obliga-
tions of marriage, the absence of any obligation to share at termina-
tion may undermine the claim of domestic partners to the benefits
they seek during their ongoing relationship.
III. THE INTER SE OBLIGATIONS (BURDENS) OF COHABITATION
The preceding Parts of this Essay involve claims that a couple may
make against the state or one party's employer. In contrast, this Part
treats claims that one party may make against the other at the termina-
tion of their relationship. This is the direct province of Marvin.
Under what circumstances should such claims be recognized and, im-
plicitly, under what circumstances should they be rejected? Marvin
adopted the rubric of contract: inter se claims should be recognized
only to the extent both parties agreed they would be. Marvin has
been much criticized as unworkable, inapt, artificial, and inadequately
responsive to a range of worthy claims.'02 It is not my purpose here to
review that criticism, but rather to discuss an alternative approach and
to situate that approach in a body of law and practice that not only
recognizes marriagedike obligations, but also, as this Essay has shown,
increasingly recognizes marriage-like rights in employment benefits
and in civil status.
102 See ALI PRINciPLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 6.03, reporter's n,
cmt. c; Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1160-70; sources cited supra note 4.
Application of the rubric of contract to rfonmarital cohabitation has generated
considerable dissatisfaction, for it tends to produce two problems. Either courts
reach harsh and undesirable results by applying contract law strictly. Or, in an effort
to avoid harsh results, courts play havoc with contract law, distending it'beyond recog-
nition. Moreover, the contractual rubric tends to be very difficult and time-consum-
ing to administer.
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A. Status Developments in American State Law
Since Marvin was decided, a few state courts have taken the path
that the California Supreme Court declined to take in Marvin when it
disapproved a brief line of decisions of the California Court of Ap-
peal, including In re Marriage of Cay,103 which applied the California
Family Law Act104 to nonmarital partners who lived in stable
nonmarital cohabitation. Caty effectively asked: "Has this nonmarital
family behaved like a marital family? If so, why not apply our already
well-developed family law?" With respect to property rights, Cary has
been followed by Washington, which applies its state community prop-
erty law to long-term stable nonmarital domestic relationships.1
0° Mis-
sissippi has occasionally done likewise,10 6 and several Oregon
103 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 866-67 (Ct. App. 1973). To the same effect, see Estate of
Atherley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41, 46-48 (Ct. App. 1975). But see Beckman v. Mayhew, 122
Cal. Rptr. 604, 607-08 (Ct. App. 1975) (rejecting the holding and anal)sis of Caryand
Atherley).
104 CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 4000-5137 (West 1994) (repealed 1992).
105 See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 835-37 (Wash. 1995) (holding that at
the dissolution of "meretricious" relationships, the court should rely on the commu-
nity property laws to divide between the partners all property that would have been
community property had they been married). Conner provides guidance in identify-
ing "meretricious relationships" for the purpose of this rule. Calling the phrase "a
term of art," it described a "meretricious relationship" as
a stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge
that a lawful marriage between them does not exist. ... Relevant factors
establishing a meretricious relationship include, but are not limited to: con-
tinuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the relation-
ship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of
the parties.... [A] relationship need not be "long term" to be characterized
as a meretricious relationship.... While a "long term" relationship is not a
threshold requirement, duration is a significant factor. A "short term" rela-
tionship may be characterized as meretricious, but a number of significant
and substantial factors must be present.
Id. at 834 (citations omitted); see also Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash.
1984) ("[C] ourts must 'examine the [meretricious] relationship and the property ac-
cumulations and make ajust and equitable disposition of the property." (alteration in
original) (quoting Latham v. Hennessey, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wash. 1976))); Foster
v. Thilges, 812 P.2d 523, 526 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the court need not
resolve the parties' conflicting claims regarding their intentions in acquiring prop-
erty, because "[w]here the relationship was long-term, stable, pseudomarital and the
undertakings were joint projects as in the instant case .... the couple's property is to
be divided justly and equitably, applying community property principles").
106 See eg., Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875-76 (Miss. 1986) (holding that
a homemaker has an equitable claim to property accumulated during a long-term,
cohabiting relationship, without regard to a contract inquiry); se also Evans v. Wall,
542 So. 2d 1055, 1056-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (imposing a constructive trust or,
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intermediate appellate decisions have taken a somewhat more equivo-
cal status approach to long-term cohabitation. 10 7 Courts in other
states nominally follow the contract rubric of Marvin, but nevertheless
make awards that are difficult to justify under the law of contract. 10
To the extent that the law of contract does not reach such results,
these courts also effectively apply a status construct, that is, they reach
a result that seems equitable in light of the nature of the parties' fam-
ily relationship. Finally, courts that have been willing to infer an
agreement from the parties' domestic behavior'0 9 straddle the bound-
ary between contract and status. Conduct that provides the basis for
inferring an agreement is generally also susceptible to a status treat-
ment. For example, the parties' assumption of complementary and
cooperative family roles can support a finding of implied agreement
to share property acquired during the relationship, or, more directly,
support the imposition of a status-based obligation to share
property.110
alternatively, an equitable lien to allow a woman to recover for contributions made to
improve her former partner's land); Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E.2d 1372, 1374 (Mass,
1989) (relying upon constructive trust doctrine to award a woman a one-half interest
in the home in which the partners lived during the cohabitation, but which was titled
solely in the man's name).
107 See Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) ("[We) may
distribute property owned by the parties in a non-marital domestic relationship. The
primary consideration in distributing such property is the intent of the parties. How-
ever, ... in distributing the property of a domestic relationship, we are not precluded
from exercising our equitable powers to reach a fair result based on the circum-
stances of each case." (citations omitted)); Shuraleff v. Donnelly, 817 P.2d 764,
768-69 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (involving a fourteen-year cohabitation).
108 See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906 (NJ. 1979). But see Watts v.
Watts, 448 N.W.2d 292, 296-97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theoy of
Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 21-23 (1989).
109 Marvin contemplates agreements implied by the parties' domestic behavior,
and some California courts have been willing to infer agreements from the parties'
domestic behavior. See, e.g., Byrne v. Laura, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 914 (Ct. App. 1997);
see also Glasgo v. Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) ("Recovery for
parties seeking relief would be based only upon legally viable contractual and/or eq-
uitable grounds which the parties could establish according to their own particular
circumstances."), quoted with approval in Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind. Ct,
App. 1995); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 435-38 (W. Va. 1990) (allowing recov-
ery based on express or implied contract); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 311-12
(Wis. 1987).
110 Consider, for example, how the facts of In re Marriage of Cary, 109 Cal. Rptr.
862, 863 (Ct. App. 1973), would have been treated by the Marvin court under its
expansive contract rubric. The complementary behavior of the parties in having and
raising four children provided ample basis for an implied "share and share alike"
contract. M
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B. The American Law Institute's Treatment of the Inter Se Obligations of
Nonmarital Cohabitants
Chapter 6 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution"1
treats the financial claims that one nonmarital partner may have
against the other at the termination of their relationship.' 12 Chapter
6 takes the view that the equitable considerations shaping the finan-
cial rules that the Principles apply at the end of a marriage are equally
pertinent at the end of a stable nonmarital cohabitation of substantial
duration, whether same-sex or opposite-sex.113 Thus, at the termina-
tion of nonmarital cohabitation Chapter 6 applies, with minor varia-
tion, the same rules that control property distribution and continuing
obligations, if any, to share income after a marriage has ended. Chap-
ter 6 was presented to the ALI membership for final approval in May
2000.114 After vigorous debate, it was approved by a substantial major-
ity of the members.
The ALI treatment begins with the premise that, if both parties so
desire, they may always join together and explicitly contract for the
terms of their relationship.' 1 5 Thus, the task of Chapter 6 is to formu-
late an appropriate set of default rules, in other words, the rules that
should govern when the parties have not otherwise provided. Chapter
6 could have required that a nonmarital claimant affirmatively prove
an agreement specifying the claims available at permanent separation.
Or, it could have provided equitable rules that would apply to qualify-
ing domestic relationships unless one of the parties proves an incon-
sistent agreement. The ALI chose the latter approach for many
reasons, which are extensively discussed in the commentary of Chap-
111 ALI Pm capis (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 6.01. The ensuing dis-
cussion of the ALI Pincipes is adapted from prefatory materials prepared by the au-
thor for Chapter 6 of the Principles. Those prefatory materials will be published in
Chapter 1 of the ALI Principles.
112 Chapter 6 is limited to the following question: what are the economic rights
and responsibilities of the parties to eadi othwr at the termination of their nonmanital
cohabitation? The Prindples deal onlywith the obligations of the parties to each other
and to their children at family dissolution. They do not create any rights against the
government or third parties. Thus, Chapter 6 should not be understood to reive ie
doctrine of common-law marriage.
113 Chapter 4 regulates property distribution, and Chapter 5 recasts spousal sup-
port as "compensatory payments." See PRnciPLrs OF THE LxW OF FAMILY DssoLUtON:
ANALYsis AND RECOMNMENDATIONS chs. 4, 5 (Proposed Final Draft 1997) [hereinafter
ALI Pnmci.s (Proposed Final Draft 1997)].
114 ALI PRnwcipL.Vs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, cl. 6.
115 Chapter 7 of the Prindplesallows them to do so, within the formal and substan-
tive limitations set out by that chapter for contracts between marital and nonmariul
partners.
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ter 6.116 Those reasons roughly fall into two categories. The first re-
lates to the intentions of the parties. The second is normative.
The ALI concluded that the parties' failure to marry should not
be understood to signify that the parties agreed that they would have
no economic obligations to each other. 1 7 First, as the incidence of
cohabitation has dramatically increased and cohabitation has become
socially acceptable at all levels of society, it has become increasingly
implausible to attribute special significance to the parties' failure to
marry. Jan Trost, the Swedish sociologist, first observed this in Swe-
den and Denmark, which have long had the highest cohabitation
rates in the world. Trost concluded that the more frequent cohabita-
tion becomes, the less cohabitation signifies. 118 When cohabitation
becomes well established as a social institution, people do not choose
to cohabit rather than marry. They simply cohabit. 1 9 Second, do-
mestic partners may fail to marry for many reasons. Among others,
some may-have been unhappy in prior marriages and therefore wish
to avoid the form of marriage, even as they enjoy its substance with a
domestic partner. Some begin a casual relationship that develops into
a durable union, by which time a formal marriage ceremony may
seem awkward or even unnecessary in view of widespread, albeit gen-
erally erroneous, popular belief that time alone transforms cohabita-
tion into common-law marriage.' 20 Failure to marry may reflect
group mores. Some ethnic and social groups have a substantially
lower incidence of marriage and a substantially higher incidence of
116 See ALI PRINcIPLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, §§ 6.02 cmts., 6.03
cmts.
117 In the debate that preceded the ALI membership's adoption of Chapter 6, the
crux of the opposition position seemed to be that the failure of cohabitants to marry
should be interpreted to signify an agreement of the parties that they would have no
obligations to each other should their relationship end. Thus, the adoption of Chap-
ter 6 would frustrate the intentions of both parties to a cohabiting relationship.
The ALI position on the intentions of the parties with respect to the possible
demise of their relationship is that nonmarital couples who do not make explicit con-
tracts about the subject are most likely to either have no intentions at all or have no
common intentions. It is of course possible that one of the parties may avoid mar-
riage with the hope of avoiding obligation to the other, but the ALI concluded that
the law has no interest in vindicating the intention of one party only. Under the ALl
Principles, that party must secure the consent of the other to avoid any duties that
would otherwise flow from the relationship.
118 JAN TRosT, UNMARRIED CoHABrrATION 185-87 (1979).
119 For more recent discussion of this point, see Kathleen Kiernan, The Rise of
Cohabitation and Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 15 INT'L J.L. POL' &
F.fi. 1, 3 (2001), and sources cited therein.
120 In the United States, this is expressed in the popular myth that, after seven
years of cohabitation, cohabitants are common-law spouses.
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informal domestic relationships than others. Failure to marry may
also reflect strong social or economic inequality between the partners,
which allows the stronger partner to resist the weaker partner's prefer-
ence for marriage. Finally, there are domestic partners who are not
allowed to marry each other under state law because they are of the
same sex, although they are otherwise eligible to marry and would
marry one another if the law allowed them to do so. In all of these
cases, the absence of formal marriage may have little or no bearing on
the character of the parties' domestic relationship and on the equita-
ble considerations that underlie claims between laxful spouses at the
dissolution of a marriage.
Normatively, the ALl takes the position that family law should be
concerned about relationships that are indistinguishable from mar-
riage, except for the legal formality of marriage. The more frequent
such relationships become, the more the law should be concerned.
Chapter 6 assumes as its foundation Chapters 4 and 5 of the Prindples,
which define and rationalize the economic claims that one spouse has
upon another at the termination of a marriage. The equitable con-
cerns that are expressed there apply equally to marriage-like cohabita-
tion. Chapters 4 and 5 do not conceive marriage as a contract whose
terms require the equitable remedies contained in those chapters.
They instead see those remedies and obligations as arising over time
from the parties' conduct in sharing their lives.
2 1
The ALl sought to formulate rules that would distinguish rela-
tionships that are marriage-like from those that are not. It also sought
rules that would be readily administrable, but would allow for individ-
ualized treatment, in other words, rules that would easily dispose of
run-of-the-mill cases but that would allow persons to show that they
should not be covered by the rules. Finally, it sought rules that would
give due weight to the economic interests of children born in
nonmarital relationships.
In general, the ALI defines domestic partners as "two persons of
the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a sig-
nificant period of time share a primary residence and a life together
as a couple." 22 Routine cases do not, however, require direct proof
that the relationship of the parties fully satisfies this definition. In-
stead, the operative provisions of the Principles set out an absolute rule
121 A similar approach has been entertained by the Reporter of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Traisition, 59 Mo. L
REv. 21, 36-41 (1994) (proposing an intestacy statute for unmarried couples who
lived in a "marriage-like relationship" prior to the death of one of them).
122 ALI PanwcipLs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 6.03(1).
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and a presumption, which assure that few cases will involve any bur-
densome factual inquiry.
When parties have lived together in a common household for a
specified uniform period of time with a child of both of them, they are
domestic partners. 123 The ALl Principles do not specify any particular
period of time, but leave that decision to the enacting state.124 (Other
English-speaking jurisdictions often set a two- or three-year minimum
period of cohabitation.
2 5 )
When parties are not the co-parents of a child, but have shared a
common household for a specified uniform period of time, they are
presumed to be domestic partners. 26 The specified period should be
longer when they do not have a child. For example, if two years were
used when the parties do have a child together, three years would be
appropriate when they do not. The presumption requires that the
parties share a common household, which is generally defined as one
that is occupied exclusively by the parties and their relatives.' 27 The
purpose of this requirement is to make the presumption unavailable
to persons who merely share a group residence, such as college stu-
dents. 28 The presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the
parties did not in fact share life together as a couple, as that term is
defined in the guidelines for determining whether parties shared life
together as a couple. 2 9 If neither the absolute rule nor the rebutta-
ble presumption applies, the claimant bears the burden of showing
that (i) for a significant period of time (ii) the parties shared a pri-
mary residence and (iii) a life together as a couple within the mean-
ing of the guidelines. 30 Such cases should be rare.
Under the contractual rubric of Marvin, every cohabitation case
requires extensive fact finding. By contrast, the ALl formulation re-
quires such fact finding only when a party seeks to rebut the presump-
tion that the parties are domestic partners on the ground that they
did not in fact share life together as a couple, or a claimant who can-
not bring himself within the absolute rule or the presumption never-
theless seeks to assert a claim.' 3 1 Such efforts are likely to be rare
because most would be either unsustainable or of little economic
123 Id. § 6.03(3)-(4).
124 Id § 6.03(6).
125 See infra text accompanying notes 137-56.
126 ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 6.03(3)-(4).
127 See id. § 6.03(4).
128 See id. § 6.03 illus. (i).
129 See id. § 6.03(7).
130 Id. § 6.03(6).
131 See id. § 6.03.
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value. For those infrequent cases, the ALl sets out criteria intended to
guide the court in determining whether the parties shared life to-
gether as a couple for a significant period of time. That list includes,
inter alia, the character of the parties' social and economic relation-
ship, the extent to which the relationship wrought changes in the life
of either or both parties, the parties' community reputation as a
couple, and the extent to which the parties acknowledged commit-
ment and responsibilities to each other, including the parties' enroll-
ment as domestic partners in a benefit scheme or employee benefit
plan.'
32
Once the parties have been found to be domestic partners, they
are generally subject to the property and compensatory payment
(spousal support) '3 3 rules of the ALI Principles, unless they have made
an inconsistent agreement setting different terms. 34 With respect to
compensatory payments, only relatively long-term cohabitation can
give rise to compensatory claims, for they have a minimum vesting
period.' 35 Domestic partnership status alone is insufficient to gener-
ate significant compensatory payment claims.' 3 6  Similarly, the
amount of marital property is usually proportionate to the duration of
the marriage. Thus, the duration of cohabitation is likely to be the
main determinant of property claims. The most troubling aspect of
the Marvin contractual rubric has been its incapacity to respond to
long-term cohabitation claims. 137 By contrast, those are the claims
most likely to be reached effectively by the ALI rubric.
C. The Use of Status Constructs by Our Cultural Cousins
In developing Chapter 6, the ALI reporters did not have to
search for models in exotic or remote places. In addition to the states
of Washington' 38 and Oregon,139 the reporters received guidance
132 See id § 6.03 (7) (a)-(m).
133 Chapter 5 of the ALI Principles rationalizes and reconceptualizes spousal sup-
port as "compensatory payments." ALI PRirNcL.cS (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra
note 113, § 5.01 cmt. a.
134 ALI PINcIPLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 6.01(2).
135 ALI PmNciPLs (Proposed Final Draft 1997), supra note 113, § 5.05 cmt. c.
136 Id.
137 See ALI PRuNCIPLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 6.03, Reporter's
Note cmt. c.
138 See supra note 105.
139 See supra note 107.
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from our closest English-speaking cultural cousins, particularly Ca-
nada, Australia, and New Zealand.
140
Ontario (Canada) includes cohabitants as well as lawfully married
persons in its statutory definition of "spouse" for purposes of inter se
support obligations. 141 A "spouse" includes "either of a man and wo-
man who are not married to each other and have cohabited, (a) con-
tinuously for a period of not less than three years, or (b) in a
relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive
parents of a child."
142
In M. v. H., 14 3 a same-sex cohabitant challenged the Ontario stat-
utory definition ("either of a man and woman who are not married to
each other and have cohabited") as violative of the equal protection
guarantee of the Canadian Charter.144 Reasoning that financial de-
pendency and interdependency, to which the statute is designed to
respond, are no less likely in same-sex cohabitation than in opposite-
sex cohabitation, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the
exclusion of same-sex cohabitants is not rationally connected to the
legislative objective of assuring adequate economic support for cohab-
itants at the termination of their relationships.
45
Effectively combining Ontario statutory and case law, the British
Columbia (Canada) support statute includes both opposite-sex and
same-sex partners within its definition of "spouse," providing that, for
purposes of spousal support, a "spouse" includes a person who "lived
with another person in a marriage-like relationship for a period of at
140 Indeed, shortly before Chapter 6 of the Principles was presented to the ALI
membership in May 2000, the government of New Zealand introduced legislation
closely resembling Chapter 6. See Vernon Small, Married and Gay Equal in New Law,
N.Z. HERALD, Apr. 3, 2000, at 1.
For current Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand legislation, see text immedi-
ately infra. Early Canadian and Australian legislation is discussed by Carol Bruch,
Nonmarital Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries: A Study inJudicial-Legislative Inter-
action, 29 AM. J. Comw. L. 217, 234-35 (1981). For a survey of Latin-American, Euro-
pean, and Israeli treatment of stable, nonmarital cohabitation in the early 1980s, see
Blumberg, supra note 2, at 1170-76.
The first issue of 15 INrr'LJ.L. POL'Y & F.Am. (2001) is devoted entirely to articles
on the demography and legislative regulation of cohabitation in Europe.
141 Ontario Family Law Reform Act of 1986, R.S.O., ch. F-3, §§ 29-30 (1990)
(Can.).
142 id. An earlier version of the Act required, under subsection (a), continuous
cohabitation for not less than five years. Ontario Family Law Reform Act of 1979, eh.
2, § 14(b), 1978 S.O. 5 (Can.).
143 [1999] D.L.R. 577.
144 Id. at 578. The Canadian Charter is equivalent to the United States
Constitution.
145 I& at 581.
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least 2 years... and, for the purposes of this Act, the marriage-like
relationship may be between persons of the same gender." 40
Legislation of New South Wales (Australia) defines a de facto re-
lationship as a "relationship [same-sex or opposite-sex] between two
adult persons... who live together as a couple, and... who are not
married to one another or related by family."147 The legislation in-
cludes a list of criteria to determine whether a relationship constitutes
a de facto relationship. 48 De facto relationships give rise to support
and property rights at the termination of the relationship by inter
vivos separation, as well as by death.149 The law of New South Wales
also creates quasi-marital rights against third parties and the state. 50
In April 2000, the government of New Zealand rejected a New
Zealand Law Commission proposal that it create a special "domestic
partnership" status for the one out of seven New Zealand couples,
same-sex and opposite-sex, who live in nonmarital cohabitation.' 5 1 In-
stead, the government proposed legislation that would treat long-term
(more than three years) stable nonmarital cohabitation equally with
marriage. 152 The proposed legislation would bring such couples,
same-sex and opposite-sex, under the New Zealand Marital Property
Act, which establishes the parties' rights at death and inter vivos disso-
lution.153 At dissolution, the Act requires an equal division of the
property acquired by either party during the relationship and
prescribes continuing support obligations in appropriate circum-
stances. 54 Like married couples, New Zealand de facto couples
would have the right to opt out of property division, provided that the
result is not "clearly unfair" to one of the parties. 1- 7 The govern-
ment's decision to treat nonmarital couples equally with married
couples, rather than create a special status for them, was widely ap-
plauded in the New Zealand press.
15 6
146 Family Relations Act of British Columbia, R.S.B.C., ch. 128, § 1 (1996)
(amended October 1, 1998) (Can.).
147 Property (Relationships) Act, 1984, N.S.W. Acrs § 4(1) (Austl.) (amended to
include same-sex relationships by the Property (Relationships) Legislation Amend-
ment Act, 1999, N.SAV A=TS § 3 (Austl.)).
148 SeeiU § 4(2).
149 See RECOGNISING SAME-SEx RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 74, at 5.
150 Id.
151 See RECOGNISING SAM]E-SEx RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 74, at 8.
152 Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001, § 2D (N.Z.), available at
http://wwv.brookers.co.nz/property.act/defalukhtm (last %isited Aug. 30, 2001).
153 & § 3(d).
154 Id. §§ 11, 32.
155 Id- §§ 21, 21J.
156 ,See New Property Law One Step Forward, N.Z. HERALD, Apr. 4, 2000, at A10.
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The ALI Principles and our cultural cousins have taken the same
status-based approach to nonmarital cohabitation, but their legisla-
tion is more simple and straightforward than the ALI's treatment.
Even though the ALl may be understood to set a new course for
American law, Chapter 6 proceeds cautiously and does not entirely
divorce itself from the spirit of Marvin. Other than when the parties
have had a child together, the ALl works by presumption rather than
by absolute rule. In the same circumstances, Ontario and British Co-
lumbia proceed by absolute rule. Similarly, facts that support a find-
ing that the parties shared life together as a couple for purposes of the
ALI formulation would equally support a loose finding of implied con-
tract under the doctrine of Marvin.
D. Why Has the United States Been So Slow to Adopt a Status-Based
Approach to Nonmarital Cohabitation?
American family law has been an inspiration to our cultural cous-
ins, leading the way in uniform child support guidelines and in mari-
tal property distribution at divorce. However, there are two puzzling
anomalies of American family law. The first is our divergent treat-
ment of inter se obligations arising from long-term stable marriage-
like cohabitation, where we conduct a generally fruitless search for an
agreement of the parties, rather than concentrate on the nature of
the parties' de facto relationship. The second is our treatment of pre-
marital agreements, which has become increasingly divergent over the
past several decades. Our cultural cousins have long been and remain
circumspect about such agreements. They do not treat the property
distribution terms of premarital agreements as per se unenforceable,
but they subject them to judicial review at divorce and may disregard
or modify an agreement if its enforcement would work an injustice. 117
157 See the English Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, § 24 (Eng.), which allows the
divorce court to make "an order varying for the benefit of the parties to the marriage
and of the children of the family or either or any of them any ante-nuptial or post-
nuptial settlement... notwithstanding that there are no children of the family." Id.
For discussion of this provision, see 13 HASBuRy's LAWs OF ENGLAND 1136 (4th ed.
1975).
Similarly, British Columbia allows "judicial reapportionment on [the] basis of
fairness" when "the provisions for division of property between spouses under their
... marriage [premarital or marital] agreement ... would be unfair" having regard to
a wide variety of equitable factors. Family Relations Act of British Columbia, 1996,
R.S.B.C., ch. 128, § 65 (Can).
The English and the British Columbia provisions, by implication, limit enforce-
ability to the property terms of a premarital or marital agreement. Terms relating to
spousal or child support are unmentioned and, presumably, unenforceable. Com-
pare the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), which enforces waivers of
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By contrast, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA), adopted
in some American jurisdictions, enlarges the purview of premarital
agreements to include spousal support as well as property distribution
and makes a premarital agreement more enforceable, in some re-
spects, than an ordinary business contract.'5 8 It is tempting to con-
clude that both anomalies simply express an American preference for
contractual resolution of interpersonal issues. We are preeminently
the land of free markets and individual self-determination. A purely
contractual approach to nonmarital cohabitation and premarital vuri-
ation of the incidents of marriage merely expresses that preference
and hence forms a logical and comprehensible part of the American
legal fabric. That is the story I have long told myself- our law may not
be good law, but it is culturally understandable and coherent.
However, a glance at our cultural cousins suggests that there may
be other explanations. They too have a well-established culture of
contract and self-determination. The significant difference between
them and us may lie in the comparative structure and transparency of
our various welfare states. In the course of writing this Essay I have
spousal support, as well as property rights, without any consideration of "firness" at
dissolution. UNiF. PmAtAPrrAL A REsrr Act § 6, 9a U.L.A. 369 (1987). For discus-
sion of state law adoption and modification of these UPAA provisions, see ALI PtuxNC.
PLxs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, § 7.05, reporter's n. cmn. b. For criticism
of the UPAA, see i. and text immediately infra.
158 Section 6 of the UPAA provides:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom
enforcement is sought proves that:
(1) that party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or
(2) the agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and,
before execution of the agreement, that party:.
(i) was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the prop-
erty or financial obligations of the other party,
(ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to
disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other
party beyond the disclosure provided; and
(iii) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate
knowledge of the property or financial obligations of tie other
party.
UNIF. PRxsiwuurAL AGREmrT Acr § 6, 9B U.LA 369, 376.
By contrast, a business contract is unenforceable if it is merely unconscionable.
To further shore up section 6, subsection (c) provides that "[a]n issue of unconscio-
nability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of la%,.."
Id!.
Of course, the UPAA represents the most extreme position with respect to the
enforceability of premarital agreements. However, it reflects a trend in American law
and has itself had considerable influence in the recent development of state case law.
For a broad survey, see ALI PwuNciPLEs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 24, ch. 7.
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come to suspect that these two strains of American law may be funda-
mentally ill-conceived and unjustifiable, even in terms of our own cul-
tural values, because they are based on three interlocking fallacies.
The first is that a society that seeks to limit the public provision of
social welfare is also one that has limited interest in the social welfare
of its citizens. (The view tends to equate the state's public assistance
liability with the limits of the state's welfare concerns.) The second
fallacy is the failure to recognize that we do indeed have a significant,
albeit largely hidden, welfare state and to recognize the roles that vari-
ous institutions play in the construction of that welfare state.16" The
third, and closely related, fallacy is that at least some of us are truly
self-sustaining. However, even those of us employed in the primary
labor market do not fully provide for ourselves, as we like to tell our-
selves. Instead, we are part of a massive government-subsidized
scheme that channels welfare benefits to ourselves and our family
members.
60
On one level, American family law appears to understand that the
family plays a vital welfare function. Compared to our neighbors, we
have an unusually highly developed law of wealth redistribution at di-
vorce.16' However, the American discourse rationalizing that divorce
159 The usual American account is that we essentially do not have a welfare state
and that everyone is required to earn his way by the "sweat of his brow." Any back-up
provision, meager at that, is made only for children, the aged, and the disabled. How-
ever, we do have a welfare state of significant proportions, albeit one that is largely
concealed and poorly cobbled together. Itjust does not look like the welfare states of
our neighbors.
160 The particular nature of the American welfare state may serve various social
policies. Most obviously, it enforces a norm of full-time market employment for at
least one family member, in order to secure vital welfare benefits otherwise generally
unavailable to an individual or family other than through public assistance.
161 A comparative approach to the welfare function of divorce law suggests an in-
verse relationship between the extent of public provision of social security and the
development of an (at least apparently) robust and elaborate law of private family
rights and obligations.
One measure of the extent to which a country makes public provision for tie
consequences of family breakdown is the degree to which it manages, by public provi-
sion, to reduce the number of children in one-parent families who would otherwise
live in poverty. In first-world (OECD) countries, children in one-parent families are
similarly at high risk of poverty before government transfers are taken into account.
OECD standards, used for international comparison of developed countries, show a
U.S. poverty rate of sixty percent for one-parent families, as compared to eleven per-
cent for two-parent families. See Lee Rainwater & Timothy M. Smeeding, Doing Poorly:
The Real Income of American Children in a Comparative Perspective 12 (Luxembourg In-
come Study Working Paper, No. 127, 1995). However, by government transfers, half
of OECD countries manage to reduce by more than seventy-five percent the number
of children in one-parent families who would otherwise be in poverty. Id. at fig. 6.
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law tends to ignore its public welfare function and instead justifies
redistribution in terms of the equities between the parties. To the
extent that either rationale would suffice, no harm is done by this
lacuna. Nevertheless, focusing solely on the equities between the par-
ties can be harmful when that rationale may not be fully persuasive.
For example, fairness between the parties may ordinarilyjustify prop-
erty distribution at divorce. However, when a party has by premarital
agreement waived the right to property distribution at divorce, en-
The rest manage reductions between twenty-five and fifty percent, uith the exception
of Canada, Australia, and the United States. Id. The United States reduces poverty by
public transfer by the very least, by about ten percent. Id.
The United States has long had the least developed public welfare state and the
most elaborate and extensive law of family obligations at divorce. Canada and Austra-
lia place second and third in both respects. In recent decades, Canada and Australia
have adopted many aspects of American family law, particularly property division
rules and uniform child support guidelines. Correspondingly, countries that are suc-
cessful in avoiding poverty by public transfer appear to have less developed and elabo-
rate private law applicable at family breakdown.
This is not to suggest that private transfer rules are an effective substitute for
public transfers. On the contrary, the data indicate othenise. Nevertheless, in those
countries that have reduced public welfare functions in order to revitalize their econ-
omies, the concurrent "privatization" of family support through the establishment of
private support obligations may be read to express a public concern about adequate
support and an intention to provide support by alternate, albeit private, means.
To the extent that the government continues to act as a minimal provider of last
resort, concern for the public fisc is also expressed in the articulation of family obliga-
tions. In countries that have reduced, or seek to reduce, their public welfare func-
tions, this direct relationship between public welfare and private obligations is evident
throughout the skein of family obligations, including property division, spousal sup-
port, and child support. For such countries, it is thus a short and inevitable step to
expand the definition of "spouse" to include, first, opposite-sex couples who live in
stable cohabitation and, next, same-sex couples who do likeise.
In the United States, this account describes only our experience with child sup-
port. The only categorical program that contemplates income support for broken
families is the child-focused Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) pro-
gram, the successor to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Se supra
note 9. The program is universal in that it covers all children ithout regard to the
marital status of their parents or the social relationship, if any, of their parents. Cor-
respondingly, despite prior law to the contrary, the American law of parental child
support obligations has developed into a universal s)stem that makes no distinction
between children born in- and out-of-wedlock. Even so, the public welfare concern
most often expressed in federal AFDC and TANF legislation is to protect the fisc from
avoidable public expenditure (see also the UPPA proviso for spousal support when a
former spouse would othenise go on public assistance, discussed iinfra in the text at
note 162), rather than the public welfare concern in assuring that adequate resources
are devoted to the next generation of citizens. The absence of tie latter concern is
also reflected in a history of public payments grossly insufficient to accomplish that
goal.
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forcement of that waiver is arguably "fair as between the parties" in
light of their premarital agreement. On the other hand, enforcement
of that contract may entirely undermine the welfare function of di-
vorce law. Only by ignoring that welfare function can the law of pre-
marital agreements blithely enforce the contract without further
examination.
In fact, the UPAA drafters might reply, they do take into account
public welfare by providing that a premarital support waiver is en-
forceable except to the extent required to keep a divorcing spouse off
public assistance.' 62 However, protection of the public treasury does
not exhaust the limits of the state's interest in the social welfare of its
citizens. Property division and spousal support are not limited to
amounts necessary to keep a former spouse off public assistance. Nor
are tax-subsidized employee health and pension benefits so limited.
The fallacy here is the assumption that the welfare function of di-
vorce-law economic redistribution extends no further than protecting
the public treasury.
Similarly, a law of family dissolution that exempts nonmarital co-
habitants from coverage, as the Marin contractual rubric often effec-
tively does, is insensitive to the welfare function of family law. To
fulfill its welfare function, family law should cover all marriage-like
relationships, the ceremonial and the nonceremonial alike. It is only
when the welfare function of family law is ignored that the fact of
marriage, that is, the existence of an explicit contractual undertaking,
can assume decisive significance.
That all stable conjugal relationships of substantial duration
should be subject to the coverage of family law seems self-evident to
many of our neighbors. Why is this not equally self-evident to us? In
many ways we are like our neighbors. All Western countries have ex-
perienced extraordinary growth in the rate of nonmarital cohabita-
tion during the last three decades. 163 All have responded with some
form of legal regulation, although most with legal regulation that is
162 Section 6 of the UPAA provides:
(b) If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates spousal
support and that modification or elimination causes one party to the
agreement to be eligible for support under a program of public assis-
tance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwith-
standing the terms of the agreement, may require the other party to
provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that eligibility.
UNII. PIEMAxrrAL AGREEMNT Acr § 6(b), 9B U.LA. 369, 376 (1987).
163 For American data, see supra notes 10-11. For European data, see Kiernan,
supra note 119.
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quite different from our own.'6 What distinguishes us is our histori-
cal and cultural experience with social welfare and, in particular, the
state's role as a provider of social welfare.165 Looking abroad helps us
to recognize the extent to which the American family (whether mari-
tal or nonmarital) serves vital economic functions that, in other coun-
tries, are more often assumed by society at large. In other words, a
comparative perspective points up the relative importance of Ameri-
can private law in assuring the welfare of children and adults at family
dissolution. There is, however, a paradox. Although the family plays
a greater role in the well-being of its members in the United States
than it does in nations that have a more highly developed and trans-
parent public welfare system, the American state's relatively weak and
cloaked role as a provider of social welfare seems to obscure the wel-
fare function of the American family. More fully developed welfare
states tend to be more self-conscious about the welfare function of the
family, even as they rely on it less heavily as a source of welfare for
family members. Thus, when faced with growing economic pressure
on their provision of welfare services (largely resulting in the decline
of the welfare state), such highly developed welfare states have re-
sponded with a facially robust private law of rights and responsibilities
at divorce and at the termination of nonmarital cohabitation. This
pattern is evidenced in countries that are culturally closest to the
United States, such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and England.
In such countries, the trend has been to substitute private obligations
for public obligations, that is, to substitute property division and fam-
ily support obligations for public social security.1cG In such cases, the
substitutionary role of private law ultimately paved the way for uni-
164 See text accompanying supra notes 137-57.
165 See text accompanying supra notes 5-9 and supra note 161.
166 New Zealand provides a good example. Until the early 1980s, New Zealand
was a model welfare state, with a highly redistributive tax-and-benefits wealth transfer
system. See Ian Shirley et al., Family Change and Family Poliies: New Zealwnd, in Fx .tLv
CHANGE AND FAMILY PoUCI=s IN GREAT BRAiN, NEW ZEALND, AND THE UNrED
STATES 207, 212-14 (Sheila B. Kammerman & Alfredj. Kahn eds., 1997). Plagued by
a declining economy, in 1984 New Zealand undertook a radical program of privatiza-
don and reduction of its tax-and-benefits wealth transfer system, often characterized
as "Rogernomics" after the Labour minister, Roger Douglas, who initiated the pro-
gram. Each successive amendment of the Marital Property Act has strengthened the
role of property distribution and family support at dissolution of family relationships.
See id. at 212-21.
Similarly, "Thatcherism" in England was accompanied by the "priuatization" of
child and spousal support duties. See supra notes 16-17.
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form inclusion of all cohabiting couples, whether formally married or
not.1
67
Unlike most other Western countries, the United States has never
committed itself to the comprehensive goals of a fully developed wel-
fare state. 16s Consequently, it is not ordinarily thought to be the role
of the government to guarantee the social welfare of its citizenry. This
perspective may have affected the way the United States has conceptu-
alized and rationalized family law obligations, as compared to coun-
tries that have experienced the content and ethos of a more fully
realized welfare state. Specifically, American family law does not rec-
ognize or acknowledge the extent to which the law of private family
obligations serves a public function. This blind spot does not follow
logically from the view that the government is not obliged to guaran-
tee the social welfare of its citizenry. We could nevertheless subscribe
to he notion that one reason to assign private family obligations is to
serve the public interest in the economic welfare of all citizens. In
other words, we could endorse the public interest goal without taking
the view that the state should subvent its cost. Nevertheless, our his-
toric disinclination to acknowledge that we publicly subvent that cost
may prevent us from seeing that public welfare is an important goal of
family law generally. Thus, our law of family support obligations gen-
erally seeks to determine what is "fair" as between the parties, albeit
increasingly in a generalized rather than individualized way. Our fam-
ily law literature often strains to rationalize, as "fairness between the
parties" the obligations imposed by private family law. This is not to
suggest that "fairness between the parties" is not an important ele-
ment in the law of family obligations. But it is not a full explanation
of the significance of such obligations. As a rationale for obligations,
it may be incomplete but unproblematic when the issue is merely ra-
tionalizing a general statutory obligation to share the fruits of marital
labor at divorce or to support a former spouse and the children of the
marriage after divorce. But it is distinctly inadequate in two important
areas of family law, namely (i) the enforceability of agreements (usu-
ally premarital, but occasionally marital) waiving rights otherwise ac-
cruing to married persons and (ii) the treatment of stable nonmarital
cohabitation. The unusual content of American law, as compared to
that of our neighbors, on both subjects may be explained by our ex-
clusive focus on the question: what is fair as between the parties? Dif-
fering perspectives on the role of the'state and the concealed nature
of our particular welfare state may explain significant differences be-
167 See text accompanying supra notes 137-63.
168 See text accompanying supra notes 5-9.
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tween the United States and our cultural cousins in the legal treat-
ment of nonmarital cohabitation and premarital agreements.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has described and analyzed, at times from a compara-
tive perspective, three significant American developments concerning
nonmarital cohabitation. It has organized those developments within
the rubric of rights and responsibilities and has attempted to link aspects
of the developments to the unusual character of the American welfare
state. The linkage of employment and basic welfare provision in the
American employee (or shadow) welfare state 69 explains the Ameri-
can initiative to obtain workplace recognition of nonmarital cohabita-
tion as a variant of marriage. The same linkage of employment and
basic welfare provision may also explain a corresponding de-linkage of
family rights and responsibilities, for in the American employee wel-
fare state, welfare rights are "earned" and welfare responsibilities are,
contradistinctively, contractually undertaken (or not undertaken).
The de-linkage of rights and responsibilities is most prominent in the
Marvin contractual treatment of nonmarital cohabitation and the
UPAA treatment of premarital agreements.
Nevertheless, recent American developments may also be read to
suggest that the United States is likely to join its cultural cousins in
linking family rights and responsibilities. In practice, initiatives to se-
cure employment-related benefits for nonmarital family members fre-
quently raise the issue of corresponding responsibilities. 170 Moreover,
the increasing availability of rights for nonmarital family members en-
courages nonmarital cohabitants to register themselves as a family
unit and should correspondingly make it difficult for them to repudi-
ate that status at family dissolution by death or inter vivos separation,
at least under a rubric that examines their family behavior, as opposed
merely to their contractual undertakings. 171 Finally, the quest for
same-sex marriage has prompted a fresh look at the rights and respon-
sibilities of marriage by persons long denied access to that institution
and has begun to generate a thoughtful literature on the meaning of
169 See text accompanying supra notes 6-8.
170 See text accompanying supra notes 89-102.
171 On the other hand, the Marvin rubric has not been accompanied by the devel-
opment of a doctrine of "marriage by estoppel." Unsuccessful Maruin cases fre-
quently reveal that the defendant filed joint (marital) tax returns uith his cohabitant
and represented her as his wife for purposes of health benefits (often for childbirth).
Such facts have not been held to estop the defendant from denying an agreement to
be treated as a married person. See cases collected in ALI PjuNciptI.s (Tentative Draft
2000), supra note 24, § 6.03, Reporter's Note to comment b.
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marriage and the linkage of family rights and responsibilities.172 Just
as same-sex couples have spurred the movement to regularize
nonmarital cohabitation, so their fresh and sustained examination of
an institution that most Americans have long taken for granted may
shed useful light on the social and welfare functions of the family,
whether marital or nonmarital.
172 See sources cited supra note 33; see also Chambers, supra note 11, at 452-61
(Federal and state laws regarding marriage aim to "recognize affective or emotional
bonds," aid in "creating an environment that is especially promising or appropriate
for the raising of children," or demonstrate "assumptions (or prescriptive views)
about the economic arrangements" between partners.); Donovan, supra note 85, at
652-55 (emphasizing the role of the public expectations that flow from legal recogni-
tion of relationships); Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Re-
sponsibility, 32 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 163, 163 (1995) ("To date, partnerships have
conferred benefits only; the most logical progression is for partnerships to include
responsibilities of support, commitment and obligation within the economic partner-
ship construct of emerging family law.").
[IVOL. 76:51310
